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Abstract
This Article will present an overview of how the European Community (“Community” or
“EC”) has initiated the liberalization process. It will also discuss the current state of the telecom-
munications industry in the various Member States, and how Telecommunications Organizations
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INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, telecommunications industries have been or-
ganized as public utilities, because, as with the gas, water, and
electricity industries, it was otherwise difficult to balance the
public interest with profit maximization. European countries in-
itially created government agencies to manage the post, tele-
graph, and telephone services and granted them monopoly
power over the entire telecommunications industry. Subse-
quently, however, technological and economic progress made it
possible for the controlling Telecommunications Organizations'
("T.O.s") to move beyond basic services to provide more diversi-
fied and sophisticated services. This process led to the current
liberalizing trend in the telecommunications industry.
Although liberalization in the telecommunications industry
began in the United States in the late 1960's, it was not until the
1980's, with the progressive removal of trade barriers in its tele-
communications markets, that the process took hold in the Eu-
ropean Community ("Community" or "EC"). Once begun, the
process created the problem of striking a balance between liber-
alization and harmonization, and between competition and pub-
lic service. The Community's focus on liberalization, together
with technological progress and globalization of the economy,
has produced radical reforms in European telecommunications
markets.
This Article will present an overview of how the Community
has initiated the liberalization process. It will also discuss the
current state of the telecommunications industry in the various
Member States, and how T.O.s are adapting to the new regula-
tory environment.
I. BACKGROUND TO EC TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
The Commission of the European Communities ("Commis-
sion") is the Community institution responsible for enforcing
1. References to Telecommunications Organizations shall refer to public sector
undertakings and private sector organizations that enjoy special or exclusive rights.
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the Treaty Establishing the European Community2 ("EC
Treaty"), and for initiating and proposing Community legisla-
tion. This body has begun liberalizing telecommunications mar-
kets by applying Community competition rules to the telecom-
munications industry, by harmonizing the essential require-
ments for an EC regulatory framework through adoption of
standardization and mutual recognition mechanisms, and by
promoting competition in the telecommunications markets
through the creation of research and development framework
programs and trans-European networks.
The Council established the basis of this process in a pro-
gram contained in its Recommendation Concerning the Imple-
mentation of Harmonization in the Field of Telecommunica-
tions,3 adopted on November 12, 1984. At that early stage, how-
ever, the Commission faced obstacles like the limited application
of the EC Treaty's competition provisions to regulated sectors.
Moreover, Member States were very reluctant to accept the Inter-
nal Market philosophy, particularly where an economic area as
sensitive as telecommunications was implicated.
Both the European Court of Justice's judgement in the Brit-
ish Telecommunications case,4 which established the basis for ap-
plying Community competition rules to the telecommunications
sector, and the Commission's White Paper on the Completion of
the Internal Market gave impetus to the Commission's liberaliza-
tion program.5 By 1987, commercial pressures, resulting from
the growing importance of telecommunications, prompted the
Commission to introduce and regulate competition in the tele-
communications market. This led the Council to adopt a Tele-
2. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on European Union,
Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [19921 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter
TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-11)
[hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987),
[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATiES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNrrIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987).
3. Council Recommendation No. 84/549, O.J. L 298/49 (1984).
4. Italian Republic v. Commission, Case 41/83, [1985] E.C.R. 510, [1985] 2
C.M.LR. 368.
5. Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market:
White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (85) 310 Final
(June 1985).
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communications Green Paper6 on June 30, 1987, that estab-
lished objectives for attaining a Community-wide open telecom-
munications market, except in the area of mobile and satellite
communications.
These objectives were: (a) liberalization of the supply and
provision of both terminal and network equipment; (b) liberali-
zation of services, with the temporary exception of public voice
and the operation of the basic network; (c) separation of regula-
tory and operational functions, so that T.O.s are no longer both
referee and player in the telecommunications industry; (d) en-
suring open access to networks, interworking, and interconnec-
tion ("Open Network Provision" or "ONP"); (e) encouraging
European standardization, with the creation of European Tele-
communications Standards Institutes ("ETSI"); and (f) full ap-
plication of the competition rules to the telecommunications
sector.' Essentially, these general objectives have been imple-
mented through Community legislation adopted as directives.,
Delays in adapting national legislation to comply with direc-
tives can create practical difficulties for business ventures, but
EC law provides procedures for eliminating such obstacles. The
Commission, which ensures that EC law is enforced over the na-
tional law of Member States, can initiate official proceedings
against uncooperative Member States pursuant to Article 169 of
the EC Treaty.9 Some Member States, however, liberalize their
markets far beyond the Community's requirements. Thus, it is
evident that progress in liberalizing telecommunications markets
depends ultimately on how Member States implement and en-
force EC directives. Consequently, several degrees of liberaliza-
tion presently co-exist.
This Article will now examine the various subsectors of the
telecommunications industry, grouped according to the level of
liberalization attained in each at both Community and national
levels. This analysis will permit a clear identification of areas
6. Commission of the European Communities, Towards a Dynamic European
Economy- Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommu-
nications Services and Equipment, COM (87) 290 Final (June 1987) [hereinafter Tele-
communications Green Paper].
7. 1& at 4.
8. Directives stipulate Community aims. Member States must implement directives
within a prescribed time period by enacting national legislation. EC Treaty, supra note
2, art. 189.
9. Id- art. 169.
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where investment opportunities exist, areas where opportunities
will soon emerge, and areas where strategic planning is required
to foster future liberalization.
II. FULLY LIBERALIZED MARKETS: EQUIPMENT, DATA,
AND VALUE-ADDED SERVICES
A. Terminal Equipment
1. Liberalization at Community Level
In 1988, the Commission adopted a Directive on Competi-
tion in the Markets for Telecommunications Terminal Equip-
ment ("Terminal Equipment Directive")' 0 in order to liberalize
the supply of terminal equipment, thereby removing T.O. na-
tional monopoly rights in this area in most Member States. The
directive's most important stipulations were: (a) removal of
T.O.s' special and exclusive right1 to supply terminal equip-
ment;12 (b) limitation of restrictions on terminal equipment,
and suppliers thereof, to specific essential requirements;' 3 (c) a
requirement that terminal equipment be approved by an in-
dependent body 4 and that all technical network specifications
necessary for manufacturing interconnecting equipment be pub-
lished;' 5 and (d) a provision that users may be allowed to termi-
nate long-term leasing and maintenance contracts in force on
the date of the directive's adoption.' 6
The Terminal Equipment Directive was one of a series of
legislative initiatives designed to facilitate the approval of termi-
nal equipment and the harmonization of European equipment
standards. The Directive on the Initial Stage of the Mutual Rec-
ognition of Type Approval for Telecommunications Terminal
10. Commission Directive No. 88/301/EEC, O.J. L 131/73 (1988) [hereinafter
Terminal Equipment Directive].
11. While exclusive rights exist when a Member State reserves a segment of com-
mercial activity for one public or private enterprise in a geographical area, special rights
come into play when the Member State restricts the number of companies entitled to
operate in a given field or grants special advantages to some of them.
12. Terminal Equipment Directive, supra note 10, art. 2, Oj. L 131/73, at 76
(1988).
13. Id. art. 3, OJ. L 131/73, at 76 (1988).
14. Id. art. 6, OJ. L 131/73, at 76 (1988).
15. Id. art. 5, OJ. L 131/73, at 76 (1988).
16. Id. art. 7, Oj. L 131/73, at 76 (1988).
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Equipment 17 ("Type Approval Directive") began the first phase
of the harmonization program. The second phase was initiated,
on April 29, 1991, by the Directive on the Approximation of the
Laws of Member States Concerning Telecommunications Equip-
ment, Including the Mutual Recognition of their Conformity8
("Approximation Directive").
2. Liberalization at National Level
All Member States have implemented the Terminal Equip-
ment Directive. Currently, terminal equipment can be freely
traded and imported within the Community market.'9 Never-
theless, problems concerning X.25 terminal equipment2 ° persist.
All Member States have also implemented the Type Ap-
proval Directive.2 Problems exist, however, with Member State
implementation of the Approximation Directive. 2 For example,
Belgium, Greece, Ireland, and Luxembourg are in breach of
that directive's requirement that conforming national legislation
be adopted prior to November 6, 1992. Moreover, although
Germany has adopted practical measures that comply with the
directive's principles, its national laws have not been adapted.
B. Data and Value-Added Services
1. Liberalization at Community level
Thus far, the Commission has partly liberalized the telecom-
munications services market through two acts designed to
achieve complementary goals: first, the removal of exclusive and
special rights for certain services, and second, the promotion of
open and fair access to the telecommunications network infra-
structure, an essential requirement for liberalizing the provision
of services.
17. Council Directive No. 86/361/EEC, O.J. L 217/21 (1986) [hereinafter Type
Approval Directive].
18. Council Directive No. 91/263/EEC, O.J. L 128/1 (1991) [hereinafter Approxi-
mation Directive].
19. See XI Annual Report on the Control of the Application of EC Law (1993),
SEC (94) 500; see also Mr. Bangemann's answer of September 23, 1993 to question E-
1580/92 formulated by Ms. Braun-Moser (PPE) to the European Commission on June
16, 1992, O.J. C 140/2 (1994).
20. X.25 terminal equipment allows the provision of packet switching data trans-
mission services using the X.25 protocol conversion.
21. Type Approval Directive, supra note 17, OJ. L. 217/21 (1986).
22. Approximation Directive, supra note 18, OJ. L 128/1 (1991).
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a. Abolishing Special or Exclusive Rights:
The Services Directive
On June 28, 1990, the Commission adopted a Directive on
Competition in the Market for Telecommunications Services23
("Services Directive"). Thus, the Commission surpassed the is-
sue of equipment supply and proceeded to the liberalization of
telecommunications services, except for the so-called "reserved
services." Reserved services consist of simple voice transmission
and packet- and circuit-switched data services. With respect to
the latter, Member States were not obliged to provide leased line
capacity for simple resale to the public (resale of data services as
a separate service) until December 31, 1992,24 with derogations
possible, on request, until 1995.25
Protecting these sectors is justifiable because the revenue
from voice monopolies spills over into financing universal serv-
ices. Similarly, leased lines are an essential element of T.O. op-
erations. Thus, a transition period is necessary before these serv-
ices can be fully liberalized. In contrast, telex, mobile radiote-
lephony, paging, and satellite services were not classified as
reserved sectors. Nevertheless, they were excluded from the
Services Directive's scope.26
In essence, the Services Directive dictates the following: (a)
Member States' obligation to abolish T.O.s' special or exclusive
rights to supply telecommunications services, except reserved
services; (b) Member State licensing or declaration procedures
for the supply of non-reserved services that must be transparent,
objective, and non-discriminatory; (c) the abolition of access and
use restrictions on leased lines; (d) the abolition of restrictions
on signal processing, both before and after their transmission via
the public network (value added services); (e) the separation of
regulatory and operational functions, prior to July 1, 1991; and
(f) Member States' obligation to enable customers to terminate
23. Commission Directive No. 90/388/EEC, O.J. L 192/10 (1990) [hereinafter
Services Directive).
24. Id. art. 2, O.J. L 192/10, at 15 (1990).
25. Id. art. 3, O.J. L 192/10, at 15 (1990).
26. Id. art. 1(2), O.J. L 192/10, at 15 (1990). The Services Directive excluded
telex services, due to their declining economic importance. Mobile and satellite serv-
ices were excluded because the drafters were unable to reach a consensus and because
the complex nature of these services dictates that they be treated separately.
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long term contracts existing at the time the Services Directive
was adopted.
No Member State requested the derogation for data com-
munications permitted by the Services Directive. Thus, since De-
cember 31, 1992, exclusive and special rights remain for voice
telephony alone. Article 1 of the Services Directive defines voice
telephony as "the commercial provision for the public of the di-
rect transport and switching of speech in real-time between pub-
lic switched network termination points, enabling any user to
use equipment connected to such a network termination point
in order to communicate with another termination point. "27
This definition does not cover services such as voice paging (not
provided in real-time), least-cost routing (e.g., calling card serv-
ices28 and call-back services2 9 not comprising direct voice trans-
port), and intelligent network functions, such as call-forwarding
or call-waiting facilities (linked to basic services, such as voice
telephony, but not enabling the user to communicate with an-
other termination point). Nonetheless, lack of agreement
among Member States regarding the definition of public voice
services continues to hinder competition in some areas. These
gray areas are discussed below.
b. Promoting Equal and Fair Access to the Network
Infrastructure: Open Network Provision
On June 28, 1990, the Council adopted a Directive on the
Establishment of the Internal Market for Telecommunications
Services Through the Implementation of Open Network Provi-
sion °  ("ONP Directive"). This framework directive was
designed to harmonize access to, and use of, telecommunica-
tions networks and services throughout Europe and to en-
27. Id. art. 1(1), 1 7, OJ. L 192/10 (1990).
28. Calling card services enable users to charge fees for calls originating in foreign
countries to their domestic account.
29. Call-back services allow customers in country A to set up calls from country B
to country C via country A rather than making the call directly. A form of call-back
service with great diffusion is the "code-calling" service: from their overseas location,
customers dial the call-back provider's number in country A, then hang up without the
call being answered. The call-back provider traces the caller's number, returns the call,
and provides him with an open line from country A. Therefore, the customer can, in
effect, make a call that originates in country A and is thus charged at less expensive
rates.
30. Council Directive No. 90/387/EEC, OJ. L 192/1 (1990) [hereinafter ONP
Directive].
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courage the establishment of new competitive telecommunica-
tions services by ensuring "a level playing field" for all market
entrants. Hence, the objective was to allow any person or com-
pany to offer new telecommunications services via existing net-
works on equal terms and to convert existing public fixed net-
works into one pan-European network through which any opera-
tor can operate telecommunications systems. Because network
infrastructure operated as a monopoly, this directive proved an
essential measure for developing competition in the data and
value-added service fields.
Under the ONP Directive, Member States retain great lati-
tude in imposing conditions of access to their networks. States,
however, may only restrict access to public telecommunications
networks or public telecommunications services where essential
requirements of the EC legal framework are implicated, namely:
network security, network integrity, service interoperability, and
data protection."' Thus, T.O. profitability is not a valid reason to
impose restrictions.
The directive specifies areas where Open Network Provision
("ONP") may be drafted. These are: leased lines, packet- and
circuit-switched data services, integrated services digital net-
work3" ("ISDN"), voice telephony, telex, mobile services, new
types of network access, and the broadband network.'- The di-
rective made no provision for broadcasting and satellite commu-
nications.
Several directives establishing the specific ONP conditions
for each category of service have already been adopted, such as
the June 5, 1992 Council Directive on the Application of ONP to
Leased Lines 4 ("Leased Lines Directive"). This directive out-
lines the conditions under which service providers may gain ac-
31. Id. art. 2(6), OJ. L 192/1, at 3 (1990).
32. Integrated Services Digital Network is a polyvalent network, added to the ex-
isting telephone network, that provides a broad range of voice, data, image, and trans-
mission services via single access. It is currently available in all Member States except
Portugal, Greece, and Luxembourg.
33. ONP Directive, supra note 30, OJ. L 192/1 (1990).
34. Council Directive 92/44/EEC, OJ. L 165/27 (1992) [hereinafter Leased Lines
Directive]. References to CCITT Recommendations in Annex II of the existing Leased
Lines Directive will be changed to references to ETSI standards. The Commission will
add standards 34 Mbits and 140 Mbits/sec. to minimum set. INFORMATION & COMMUNI-
CATION TECHNOLOGIES IN EUROPE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS ISSUE TRACKER 7 (Bates &
Wacker May 1994).
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cess to the infrastructure. If they are legally unable to set up
their own fixed networks, the availability of leased lines on fair
terms is essential for new entrants wishing to compete in the
services market (except in the United Kingdom, where the sys-
tem is operated under license). Moreover, even if they are able
to do so, it is highly unlikely that this process would be economi-
cally feasible.
Council recommendations on the harmonized provision of
a minimum range of packet-switched data services and ISDN are
also in accordance with ONP. 5 These recommendations are
consistent with the Leased Lines Directive's general approach.
Because they are merely recommendations, however, they do
not bind Member States.
Another proposed directive establishing ONP conditions
for a specific category of service is the Proposal for a Council
Directive on Application of ONP to Voice Telephony"6 ("ONP
Proposal"), adopted on August 27, 1992, and modified on May
27, 1993 ("Amended ONP Proposal") .7 This directive applies to
voice telephony and the Public Switched Network. It does not,
however, apply to mobile networks, although it addresses inter-
connection between networks used for mobile services and fixed
public telephone networks.
The Amended ONP Proposal is designed to establish user
rights for telephone installation, improve access to service users
and providers, and boost EC-wide voice telephony services. The
proposal defines the user's basic rights to network access and
universal service, effective consumer protection mechanisms,
and the national authorities' role in supervising the proposed
directive's implementation.38
35. See Council Recommendation No. 92/382/EEC, O.J. L 200/1 (1992) (on the
Harmonised Provision of a Minimum Set of Packet- Switched Data Services (PSDS) in
Accordance with Open Network Provision (ONP) Principles); see also Council Recom-
mendation 92/388/EEC, Oj. L 200/10 (1992) (on the Provision of Harmonised Inte-
grated Services Digital Network (ISDN) Access Arrangements and a Minimum Set of
ISDN Offerings in Accordance with Open Network Provision (OPN) Principles).
36. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Application of Open Network Provi-
sion (ONP) to Voice Telephony, COM (92) 247 Final (July 1992), OJ. C 263/20 (1992)
[hereinafter ONP Proposal].
37. Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Application of Open Net-
work Provision (ONP) to Voice Telephony, COM (93) 182, OJ. C 147/12 (1993) [here-
inafter Amended ONP Proposal].
38. Id.
5651994]
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The Services3 9 and ONP4° Directives, together, create the
environment in which data services and value-added services are,
in theory, freely provided.
2. Liberalization at National Level
Liberalization has been achieved in "non problematic"
value-added services such as voice paging, call-back services, call-
ing-card services, call-forwarding, and call-waiting facilities. Tele-
communications operators have not encountered difficulties in
providing these services in the EC.
With respect to data services, certain Member States did not
meet Services Directive requirements in the prescribed period,
although most of those countries passed the necessary measures
in 1993. Spain, for example, amended its telecommunications
law to conform to the Services Directive in December 1992. The
Spanish law will be implemented through technical regulations.
The Regulation for Public Switched Data services, 41 approved in
May 1993, is the only one adopted thus far.
Italy is the only Member State that has yet to conform to the
Services Directive. Consequently, the provision of all telecom-
munications services in Italy is somewhat irregular. The Italian
Government maintains that, despite a continuing monopoly in
data services and persistent problems with leasing lines, the Ital-
ian telecommunications system, in practice, meets EC require-
ments.
Data and "non problematic" value-added services can cur-
rently be provided, although they are subject to non-discrimina-
tory authorization and declaration procedures. Such measures
are aimed at ensuring compliance with the essential require-
ments, defined as reasons based on the public interest of a non-
economic nature.42 In Spain, five companies have already been
granted licenses for data transmission: Cable & Wireless, France
T616com Redes y Servicios, Unisource, IGR, and BT Telecomuni-
caciones, of which the latter is the only firm up and running.
Licenses are still national in scope, although a Proposal for a
39. Services Directive, supra note 23, O.J. L 192/10 (1990).
40. ONP Directive, supra note 30, OJ. L 192/1 (1990).
41. Royal Decree of 28 May 1993, No. 804/1993, B.O.E. No. 139,June 11, 1993, at
17,898.
42. Services Directive, supra note 23, art. 1(1), 1 6, OJ. L 192/10, at 15 (1990).
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Directive on Mutual Recognition of Licenses4 3 ("Licensing Pro-
posal") is under discussion.
With only Italy and Greece having failed to implement the
ONP Directive" in the specified time period, fair access to infra-
structure has essentially been attained. Moreover, Italy and
Greece are presently rectifying their non-compliance. Further-
more, EC competition rules are currently fully applicable to the
telecommunications sector and are directly enforceable in all
Member States.
C. The Necessary Complements to Full Liberalization
1. Ensuring Adherence to the Competition Rules:
Commission Guidelines
In order to fulfil the requirements of the Terminal Equip-
ment"5 and Services Directives," it was essential to safeguard
emerging opportunities by preventing T.O.s from replacing
their former monopoly-based barriers with those created by re-
strictive practices. Consequently, strict adherence to the meas-
ures contained in EC Treaty Article 8547 (controlling anticompe-
43. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Mutual Recognition of Licenses and
Other National Authorizations to Operate Telecommunications Services, Including the
Establishment of a Single Community Telecommunications License and the Setting Up
of a Community Telecommunications Committee (CTC), COM (92) 254 Final (July
1992) (revised Mar. 22, 1994) [hereinafter Licensing Proposal]. This proposal would
establish a procedure allowing service providers authorized to operate telecommunica-
tions services in one Member State to provide services throughout the Community with-
out having to obtain individual licenses or authorizations from other Member States.
Id. For the period pending agreement on licensing harmonization, the modified pro-
posal establishes a so-called "one-stop-shopping" procedure to facilitate applications for
licenses in different Member States where mutual recognition is not yet achieved. Id.
The Licensing Proposal also calls for the creation of National RegulatoryAuthorities to
advise the Commission. Id. The proposal expressively excludes voice telephony, telex,
and satellite and mobile communications from its scope. Id.
44. ONP Directive, supra note 30, O.J. L 192/1 (1990).
45. Terminal Equipment Directive, supra note 10, OJ. L 131/73 (1988).
46. Services Directive, supra note 23, OJ. L 192/10 (1990).
47. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 85. Article 85 reads as follows:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common mar-
ket: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of under-
takings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member
States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the common market, and in particular those
which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trad-
ing conditions;
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titive agreements), Article 8648 (controlling monopoly abuse)
and Article 90" (applying all EC Treaty rules, in particular Arti-
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or in-
vestment;"
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trad-
ing parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or ac-
cording to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of
such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void.
3. The provision of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in
the case of: - any agreement or category of agreement between undertak-
ings; - any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices; which contrib-
utes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the
resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not in-
dispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
Id.
48. Id. art. 86. Article 86 reads as follows:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within
the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incom-
patible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between mem-
ber-States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or
other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the preju-
dice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject
of such contracts.
Id.
49. Id. art. 90. Article 90 reads as follows:
1. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member
States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor
maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty,
in particular to those rules provided for in Article 7 and Articles 85 to 94.
2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic
interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be
subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on com-
petition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the per-
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cles 85 and 86, to the public sector) was essential. As a result,
the Commission published Guidelines on the Application of EC
Competition Rules in the Telecommunications Secto ° ("Guide-
lines") to reflect legal developments since, the, British Telecommu-
nications case. The Guidelines were publicly issued on Septem-
ber 6, 1991.
The Guidelines advise public telecommunications opera-
tors, other telecommunications service and equipment suppliers
and users, the legal profession, and other interested parties, on
the general, legal, and economic principles of the Commission
upon which application of the competition rules to undertakings
in the telecommunications sector"' are based. The Guidelines
also apply to satellite communications and other telecommuni-
cations areas not regulated by the Services or ONP Directives.
The Guidelines do not bind the Commission, the Court, or na-
tional authorities. The Commission does indicate, however, that
these principles will be applied in the future, although full con-
sideration of the specificities of each case will be borne in
mind. 2
The Guidelines confirm that the reservation of particular
services does not imply T.O. exemption from competition rules.
They explain the application of Articles 85, 86, and 90 to the
telecommunications sector, describing abusive conduct" and
formance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The de-
velopment of trade must not be affected to such and extent as would be con-
trary to the interest of the Community.
3. The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of this Arti-
cle and shall, where necessary, address appropriate directives or decisions to
Member States.
Id.
Article 90 confirms that EC Treaty rules apply to public undertakings or undertak-
ings that have been granted special or exclusive rights by Member States. Article 90(2),
however, exempts revenue-producing monopolies and providers of services of general
economic interest from complying with these rules if these undertakings cannot other-
wise function properly. The Services and ONP Directives limit the applicability of Arti-
cle 90(2) to cases where an exemption is necessary to ensure compliance with essential
state requirements. Several rulings of the European Court ofJustice also restrict Article
90(2) exemptions. See Saees v. Zentrale, Case 66/86, [1989] E.C.R. 838, [1990] 4
C.M.L.R. 102; Criminal prosecution against Paul Corbeau, Case C-320/91, (Eur. Ct. J.
May 19, 1993) (not yet reported).
50. Guidelines on the Application of the EEC Competition Rules in the Telecom-
munications Sector, OJ. C 233/2 (1991) [hereinafter Guidelines].
51. Id. 1 8, OJ. C 233/2, at 4 (1991).
52. 1& 1 9, O.J. C 233/2, at 4 (1991).
53. Essentially, abusive conduct encompasses cross-subsidization (i.e., financing
19941
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impermissible cooperative arrangements, 54 and identifying desir-
able cooperative initiatives that will foster competitive and effec-
tive European networks.
2. Public Procurement Rules
T.O. procurement policies were not specifically included in
the Telecommunications Green Paper,55 which merely stated
that the Commission was reviewing the results of Council Rec-
ommendation 84/550/EEC for Voluntary and Partial Liberaliza-
tion of T.O. Public Procurement Practices. This review led, how-
ever, to adoption, on September 17, 1990, of a Council Directive
Relating to the Procurement Procedures for Entities in the
Water, Energy, Transport and Telecommunications Sectors56
("Procurement Directive"). Member States were to implement
this legislation by January 1, 1993, with Spain having an exten-
sion until January 1, 1996, and Greece and Portugal until Janu-
ary 1, 1998.
Because the general Community directives on open public
procurement excluded contracts for water, energy, transport,
and telecommunications services, the Procurement Directive
had considerable implications for liberalizing national telecom-
munications markets. This was especially true because T.O. mo-
nopolies generally placed orders with national producers only,
thus maintaining unjustifiably high price levels.
The major provisions of the Procurement Directive are as
follows:
- T.O.s are obliged to publish in the Official Journal of the
European Communities, at least once yearly, their antici-
pated total procurement for the following year in supply and
software service contracts with a total value of 750,000 ECU
for a particular product area, and in works contracts of at
least five million ECU;
- procedures for granting software supply and service contracts
non-reserved services with monopoly income) and usage restrictions on the provision of
reserved services, particularly network and leased circuits (e.g., discriminatory pricing,
refusal to supply, and tying the provision of the reserved service to the supply of specific
equipment or to cooperative arrangements with service providers).
54. Essentially, these are agreements between private operators and network prov-
iders that involve cross-subsidization and discrimination.
55. Telecommunications Green Paper, supra note 6.
56. Council Directive No. 90/531/EEC, OJ. L 297/1 (1990) [hereinafter Procure-
ment Directive].
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having a value of at least 600,000 ECU and works contracts of
at least five million ECU must be open, restricted, or negoti-
ated;57
- contracts must be granted to the entity offering the cheapest
price or the most economically advantageous tender. In the
absence of a reciprocal agreement with a non-Member State,
any tender may be rejected if more than half of the price
offered represents the value of products manufactured or
services provided outside of the Community. Moreover, a
preference margin, of three percent of the price offered,
must be granted to Community products or services as op-
posed to non-Community tenders, unless this would cause in-
compatibility or technical difficulties; and
- technical specifications in the call for tender must be non-
discriminatory and defined in accordance with common Eu-
ropean specifications or, where no European specifications
exist, with other Community standards. 58 Because the Pro-
curement Directive obliges T.O.s to buy European products
and services at a three-percent mark-up, it can be criticized
for inflating consumer prices. The directive's mandatory
procurement requirements will become redundant, however,
as the market becomes fully competitive.
On February 25, 1992, the Council formally adopted the
Directive for Coordinating the Laws, Regulations and Admin-
istrative Provisions Relating to the Application of Community
Rules on Procurement Procedures for Entities Operating in
the Water, Energy, Transport and Telecommunications Sec-
tors59 ("Procurement Coordination Directive"). Moreover,
on June 14, 1992, the Council adopted the Directive for Co-
57. Article 1 (6) (a) of the Procurement Directive defines open, restricted, and ne-
gotiated procedures as the
award procedures applied by contracting entities whereby.
a) in the case of open procedures, all interested suppliers or contractors may
submit tenders;
b) in the case of the restricted procedures, only candidates invited by the con-
tracting entity may submit tenders;
c) in the case of negotiated procedures, the contracting entity consults suppli-
ers or contractors of its choice and negotiates the terms of the contract
with one or more of them.
Id. art. 1(6) (a), O.J. L 297/1, at 4 (1990).
58. Id., OJ. L 297/1 (1990).
59. Council Directive No. 92/13/EEC, OJ. L 76/14 (1992) [hereinafter Procure-
ment Coordination Directive].
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ordinating the Procurement Procedures for Entities Operat-
ing in the Water, Energy, Transport and Telecommunica-
tions Sectors60 ("Procurement Procedure Directive").
III. GRAY AREA: PRIVATE NETWORKS AND CLOSED
USER GROUPS
A. Liberalization at Community Level
As previously stated, the Services Directive liberalized all
telecommunications services, except for the so-called "reserved
services."6 1 As of December 31, 1992, the concept of "reserved
services" encompassed only voice telephony, defined in the di-
rective as "the commercial provision for the public of the direct
transport and switching of speech in real-time between public
switched network terniination points, enabling any user to use
equipment connected to such a network termination point in
order to communicate with another termination point. '62 Like
all exceptions under Community Law, this definition should be
narrowly construed.
Thus, the self-provision and contracting out of data commu-
nications services within private networks and closed user groups
using capacity leased from T.O.s has been liberalized at Commu-
nity level. Moreover, because voice services provided within pri-
vate networks or to closed user groups fall outside the scope of
the Services Directive's definition of voice telephony, the provi-
sion of voice services under the same conditions have also been
liberalized.
1. Private Corporate Networks
An accurate interpretation of the definition of "voice te-
lephony" indicates that voice transmission is not a reserved ser-
vice when users cannot be connected to the public network at
both ends-that is, when users communicate through private
networks.
Thus, for example, a private network linking a firm's Ma-
drid and Barcelona offices could be used not only to make calls
from one city to the other but also to call-out to Madrid-based
60. Council Directive No. 93/38/EEC, Oj. L 199/84 (1993) [hereinafter Procure-
ment Procedure Directive].
61. See supra Section 11(B) (1) (a) (discussing reserved services).
62. Services Directive, supra note 23, art. 1(1), O.J. L 192/10, at 15 (1990).
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destinations from Barcelona via the Madrid head-office ex-
change, and vice-versa. A call from a third party's corporate net-
work to the firm's Barcelona office, however, would fall outside
the scope of liberalized services because connection to the pub-
lic network at both ends would be possible. Thus, using private
networks, users can make long-distance calls while paying only
local delivery charges to the T.O. carriers involved. This is a ma-
jor reason for Member State resistance to the unprotected provi-
sion of services.
2. Closed User Groups
The provision of voice services to a "closed user group"
should also be considered a liberalized service because, under
the Services Directive, only services provided "for the public" are
reserved.6 3 Difficulties arise, however, when attempting to de-
fine the scope of closed user groups. For example, to limit the
groups of users among whom services can be freely provided,
Member States often interpret the term to be consistent with na-
tional notions of a business "legal personality." The content of
this narrow definition may vary from state to state, however, and
does not comport with a strict interpretation of what is, essen-
tially, an exception to the general principle of service liberaliza-
tion. Moreover, it also differs from the Commission's definition.
Sources close to Directorate General IV, the entity in charge of
competition issues, report that the Commission prefers the con-
cept of "professional entity" to that of "legal person" or "eco-
nomic entity." This interpretation will allow the free provision
of voice services between entities like administrations and uni-
versities.
B. Liberalization at National Level
Ambiguity in interpreting the definition of "voice teleph-
ony" limits the potential for competition in the areas under con-
sideration here. This ambiguity stems from Member States' ap-
parent reluctance to narrowly interpret legal or technical con-
cepts where such interpretation may damage the financial
stability of their T.O.s. Consequently, the Member States are
preventing the establishment of a clear regulatory regimen and
are impeding the free provision of liberalized voice services.
63. 1&, O.J. L 192/10 (1990).
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The United Kingdom has already liberalized both reserved
and non-reserved services and, thus, ambiguity problems do not
arise there. The remaining Member States, except Italy, have
adapted their telecommunications laws to conform with the
Services Directive, and thus define "reserved services" in a man-
ner consistent with its terms. Nonetheless, in some instances,
these states have failed to adopt the specific measures necessary
to define and liberalize non-reserved services.
The Commission has attempted to resolve these problems
through bilateral discussions with Member States. Moreover, Di-
rectorate General IV has taken a case-by-case approach to solving
the problems in this area. Where problems have arisen, the
Commission has pressured Member States to take action to re-
solve them and has assessed whether the services in question
should be classified as reserved.
This approach has produced the following results: liberali-
zation of voice transmission over corporate networks in Ger-
many, since January 15, 1993; Ireland's commitment to strictly
adhere to the directive stipulations; Belgium's statement that it
had liberalized voice transmission via fixed communication links
between parties bound by a relationship beyond the simple need
to communicate via telephone (e.g., matrices/subsidiary) where
the transmission is private and does not consist of voice switch-
ing between two points of the Public Switched Network; and
although it has not yet defined reserved and non-reserved serv-
ices, Denmark's commitment to fully liberalize voice transmis-
sion over fixed links in 1994.1
Spain's telecommunications law, reformed in December
1992, now authorizes the creation and use of private voice and
data networks.65 Spain, however, has yet to adopt the technical
regulations required to implement the law.
64. XXIIIrd Competition Report from the Commission-1993, COM (94) Final, at
231-32 (May 1994).
65. Ley Diciembre 18 1987, No. 31/1987, B.O.E. No. 303, Dec. 19, 1987, at 37,409,
as amended by Ley Diciembre 3, 1992, No. 32/1992, B.O.E. No. 291, Dec. 4, 1992, at
41,268.
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IV. INCIPIENTLY LTBERAIZED MARKETS:
SATELLITE AND MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS
A. Satellite Communications
Satellite communication is a relatively small subsector of the
telecommunications field, but one with enormous potential for
growth. Such expansion, however, requires eliminating restric-
tive Member State rules that fragment the EC's satellite and
space market, thereby significantly jeopardizing the viability of
Europe's space industry.
1. Liberalization at Community Level
Satellite communications were set aside for later considera-
tion by the 1987 Telecommunications Green Paper 66 and were
excluded from the Services 67 and ONp 68 Directives. Similarly,
they are not covered by the Licensing Proposal.69 These exclu-
sions are essentially a consequence of the sector's unique nature
which calls for an independent approach towards liberalization.
a. The 1990 Satellite Green Paper: Major Directions
The satellite field was covered with the adoption of the 1990
Satellite Green Paper.7 0 The 1992 deadline for completion of
the EC internal market, together with new political imperatives
to develop satellite communications in the wake of the dramatic
political changes in Eastern and Central Europe,71 required re-
66. Telecommunications Green Paper, supra note 6, COM (87) 290 Final, at 5
(June 1987).
67. Services Directive, supra note 23, art. 1(2), O.J. L 192/10, at 15 (1990).
68. ONP Directive, supra note 30, art. 4(2), O.J. L 192/1, at 4 (1990).
69. Licensing Proposal, supra note 43, COM (92) 254, at 7 (July 1992).
70. Commission of the European Communities, Towards Europe-Wide Systems
and Services: Green Paper on a Common Approach in the Field of Satellite Communi-
cations in the European Community, COM (90) 490 Final (Nov. 1990) [hereinafter
Satellite Green Paper].
71. The Commission has emphasized that Central and Eastern European countries
must rapidly build up their telecommunications infrastructures if they are to recon-
struct their economies and integrate successfully into the wider Europe. Commission of
the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and
the European Parliament on the Community's Relations with the Countries of Central
and Eastern Europe - The Role of Telecommunications, COM (90) 258 Final (June
1990) (noting that Central and Eastern European countries, all believing that satellites
could accommodate all their communication needs, did not developed their terrestrial
network infrastructures).
1994] 575
576 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURVAL [Vol. 18:555
forming the satellite industry as suggested in the Satellite Green
Paper.
The Satellite Green Paper's main purpose was to apply gen-
eral principles of Community telecommunications policy to the
satellite communications sector, taking into account the pecu-
liarities of this form of communication and the need to maxi-
mize the development of Europe-wide satellite services.12 The
paper proposed a regulatory framework designed to encourage
the development of Community-wide systems and to control
problems arising from competition for satellite capacity.
The major regulatory changes proposed were:
- total liberalization of the earth segment (the right to up-link
and down-link signs to satellites) through elimination of spe-
cial or exclusive T.O. rights (a corollary to terminal equip-
ment liberalization);
- free and non-discriminatory access to space segment capac-
ity, without the need to obtain access to transponder capacity
through a T.O. designated operator (a corollary to ONP);
- provision of commercial freedom for space segment provid-
ers, including direct marketing of satellite capacity to service
providers and users, subject to compliance with the afore-
mentioned licensing procedures and conformity with Com-
munity laws, particularly the competition rules;
- facilitation of the provision and use of Community-wide serv-
ices through implementation of harmonization measures,
such as the mutual recognition of licenses, and type approval
procedures, frequency coordination, and co-operation for
services with non-EC countries;
- separation of operational and regulatory functions for access
to, and control of, the space segment; and
- basing all licensing schemes on objective, transparent and
non-discriminatory criteria, proportional to the objective
sought.73
b. 1991 Council Resolution: A Concrete Plan for Action
In 1991, the Council advanced the Satellite Green Paper's
general aims by defining a concrete action plan to create a com-
petition-oriented, Community-wide, satellite communications
72. Satellite Green Paper, supra note 70, COM (90) 490 Final, at 3 (Nov. 1990).
73. Id.
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market.74 Specifically, the Council committed the Commission
to the following actions: (a) extension of competition principles
currently practiced in the telecommunications terminal equip-
ment and services markets to the satellite earth station market;
(b) approximation of Member State laws governing satellite
earth stations, including mutual recognition of their conformity;
(c) establishment of a harmonized framework for licensing satel-
lite networks and services; (d) strengthening cooperation on the
frequency aspects of EC satellite services; and (e) ensuring the
free circulation and transborder use of mobile and transportable
satellite earth stations throughout the Community.'
All measures should have been implemented before Decem-
ber 31, 1992.76 To this end, and in light of the 1992 Communi-
cation on the Review of the Telecommunications Industry77
("1992 Review Communication"), EC-wide legislation was devel-
oped.
c. Pan-European Type Approval of Earth Station Equipment
The Directive on Pan-European Type Approval of Satellite
Earth Station Equipment,78 adopted in October 1993, was the
first concrete result of the initiatives stemming from the Satellite
Green Paper. Before May 1, 1995, this directive should harmo-
nize requirements for selling satellite earth station equipment in
the Community. This will create the necessary conditions for an
open and unified market and will also facilitate the development
of EC-wide satellite-based networks and services.
74. Council Resolution of 19 December 1991, OJ. C 8/1 (1992) (on the Develop-
ment of the Common Market for Satellite Communications Services and Equipment).
75. Id., OJ. C 8/1, at 2 (1992).
76. Id., O.J. C 8/1, at 1 (1992).
77. Communication by the Commission of October 21, 1992, on the Review of the
Situation in the Telecommunications Sector, SEC (92) 1048 Final (Oct. 1992) [herein-
after 1992 Review Communication]. This communication is discussed in Section V(A)
of this Article.
78. Council Directive No. 93/97/EEC, art. 1(2), OJ. L 290/1 (1993) [hereinafter
Satellite Earth Station Equipment Directive], supplementing Council Directive No. 91/
263/EEC, OJ. L 1/128 (1991). Satellite earth station equipment is equipment that can
be used for the transmission alone, transmission and reception (transmit-receive), or
reception only (receive-only) of radio signals via satellites or other space-based systems,
but excluding purpose-built satellite earth station equipment intended for use as part of
a Member State's public telecommunications network. Council Directive No. 93/97/
EEC, art. 1(2), O.J. L 290/1 (1993).
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d. Liberalization of Satellite Equipment and Services
Regarding liberalization of non-broadcasting satellite serv-
ices and equipment, Directive 94/46/EEC 9 adopted by the
Commission on October 13, 1994, shall broaden the application
of the Terminal Equipmente ° and Services"' Directives. The Di-
rective is designed to include satellite earth stations within the
existing regulatory framework. Consequently, it requires elimi-
nation of all remaining exclusive rights for import, trade, con-
nection, operation, and maintenance of satellite earth stations.
Provision is made, however, for exclusive T.O. rights in the area
of public voice telephony. T.O.s will retain these rights until a
specified date when it is expected that all special and exclusive
rights will be eliminated throughout the EC.
e. Licensing
Satellite licensing is another pressing issue. If adopted, the
Proposal for a Satellite Licensing Directive 2 ("Satellite Licensing
Proposal") would establish a licensing framework that would fa-
cilitate the creation of EC-wide satellite earth station networks
and satellite communications services without the impediment
of requiring individual Member State licenses or authorizations.
That is, operators licensed in one Member State could seek rec-
ognition of their license in other Member States.
The Satellite Licensing Proposal distinguishes between serv-
ices that require harmonizing legislation and those that do not. 3
The Commission might specify a category of satellite services
that requires harmonized regulation and then mandate that Ec-
tra 4 decide upon what these regulations should be."5 The Com-
mission might then decide the corresponding uniform licensing
79. Commission Directive No. 94/46/EC, O.J. L 268/15 (1994) (amending Direc-
tive 88/301/EEC and Directive 90/388/EEC in Particular with Regard to Satellite Com-
munications).
80. Terminal Equipment Directive, supra note 10, OJ. L 131/73 (1988).
81. Services Directive, supra note 23, Oj. L 192/10 (1990).
82. Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a European Parlia-
ment and Council Directive on a Policy for the Mutual Recognition of Licenses and
Other National Authorizations for the Provision of Satellite Network and/or Satellite
Communications Services, COM (93) 652 Final (Jan. 1994) [hereinafter Satellite Li-
censing Proposal].
83. Id at 7-8.
84. Ectra is a forum in which European National Regulatory Authorities discuss
and coordinate regulation.
85. Satellite Licensing Proposal, supra note 82, COM (93) 652 Final, at 8.
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conditions.8 6 The proposal would, however, permit the adop-
ion of different procedures.
Regarding categories of satellite services that do not require
harmonized conditions, the Commission may decide to grant
mutual recognition of licenses. Decisions concerning both cate-
gories of satellite services shall include the conditions under
which they may be provided throughout the EC.
The Satellite Licensing Proposal is likely to anger U.S. firms,
like PanAmSat, because it would restrict EC-wide licenses to
firms that are at least seventy-five percent EC-owned. The Com-
mission, however, argues that this restriction reflects similar lim-
its imposed on EC operators in the United States.
f. Development of Personal Satellite Communication
It is important to consider the development of personal
communication systems and services, the so-called Low Earth
Orbiting ("LEO") systems, and the Community's position on
regulating this field. Personal satellite communications involve
direct mobile terminal links with non-geostationary satellites or
with the next generation of geostationary satellites. Communi-
cations via such systems are established by interconnecting satel-
lites to end-users and, if necessary, through existing terrestrial
networks. The major advantage of this means of communication
is that global mobile communication services can be provided in
remote areas where neither cellular mobile nor telephone serv-
ices exist.
The relevance and strategic importance of personal satellite
communication services to European communications networks
is evident. They will encourage major shifts towards personal
mobile communications rather than fixed communications.
This, in turn, may bring about wide-ranging changes in the field
of telecommunications. Cognizant of this fact, the EC Council
of Ministers, in its Resolution on the Introduction of Satellite
Personal Services to the Community, 7 recognized the need to
develop Community policy in this area by building on the ex-
isting satellite and mobile communications policies.88
86. Id.
87. Council Resolution of 7 December 1993, 0J. C 339/1, at 1 (1993).
88. See id., 0.J. C 339/1, at 2 (1993) (stressing "the importance of developing a
Community policy with regard to satellite personal communications that will build on
existing policies regarding telecommunications, in particular satellite communications,
5791994]
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2. Liberalization at National Level
EC proposals and draft directives on satellite regulation are
developing into concrete measures. For example, Member
States must implement the Directive on Pan-European Type Ap-
proval of Satellite Earth Station Equipment 9 by May 1995. Simi-
larly, the Commission's Directive on Liberalisation of Satellite
Equipment and Services9" will be directly enforceable and Mem-
ber States have already begun to enact measures necessary to put
it into effect byJuly 1995.
In the meantime, and in advance of the recently-adopted
EC legislation, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom, together representing seventy percent of the
Community satellite market, have already incorporated some of
the Satellite Green Paper's liberalization principles into their na-
tional regulatory framework. Moreover, there is already compe-
tition between T.O.s and private businesses in the terminal
equipment and satellite communication markets, and plans are
being made to achieve mutual recognition of satellite licenses.
B. Mobile Communications
Along with the globalization of the industry and the emer-
gence of multimedia services, the growth of mobile systems rep-
resents one of the major trends dominating the world of tele-
communications today. This expansion will be a central force in
shaping the development of the EC communications and infor-
mation infrastructure. It is also central to the development of
trans-European networks, which should benefit from a balanced
relationship between fixed and mobile networks and services.
The Commission currently anticipates around forty million
users of such services by the year 2000 and up to eighty million
by 2010.91 Similarly, the market penetration could reach eighty
percent of the population with the number of personal mobile
communications systems users exceeding the number of tele-
and on future policy on mobile communications based on the Green Paper on the
subject and, if necessary, on regional development and trade policies in general").
89. Satellite Earth Station Equipment Directive, supra note 78.
90. Commission Directive No. 94/46/EC, O.J. L 268/15 (1994).
91. Comnmission of the European Communities, Towards the Personal Communi-
cations Environment: Green Paper on a Common Approach in the Field of Mobile and
Personal Communications in the European Union, COM (94) 145 Final, at 4 (Apr.
1994) [hereinafter Mobile Green Paper].
EC TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW
phone subscribers92 (i.e., over 200 million mobile users against
153 million conventional telephone users9").
European mobile communications systems fit, for the most
part, into three well-established categories of business services
based on analogue technology. These are: (a) private user busi-
ness networks or closed user group networks such as taxi services
and emergency services; (b) paging; and (c) public cellular ra-
dio communications services, such as car phones and mobile
phones. The Commission aims, however, to create a mass mar-
ket for personal communication services and generalize the use
of digital technology. The next step will be to switch from cur-
rent mobile services to personal communications services that
enable person-to-person calls, irrespective of the location, termi-
nal, transmission mode, or technology used. The Commission
seeks, ultimately, to build on the success of the current second
generation of digital mobile systems, the Global Standard Mo-
bile ("GSM"), to create a market for the third generation of per-
sonal communication technology, the Universal Mobile Tele-
communications System ("UMTS").
Europe is currently considered the world leader in digital
cellular systems. GSM, the European system, has surpassed rival
digital cellular technology developed in Japan and North
America. GSM was designed to enable communication via mo-
bile telephones from one side of the Community to the other.
The system appears, however, to have set not only a European,
but a global, industry standard. It has been, or will be, imple-
mented in more than sixty countries, most notably in Eastern
and Central Europe, the Middle East, and Asia (although not in
Japan).
1. Liberalization at Community Level
a. Initial Steps
Like the satellite industry, the mobile sector was excluded
from EC directives on opening markets, licensing, and ONP. EC
mobile policy was initiated in 1987, however, and since then
action has been taken in a number of important areas of the
sector. In 1987, the Council of Ministers adopted a Recommen-
92. Id
93. Id. at 12.
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dation 94 ("GSM Recommendation"), and accompanying Direc-
tive95 ("GSM Directive"), promoting the coordinated introduc-
tion of GSM. The GSM Recommendation outlined targets for
the development and availability of GSM,96 and the GSM Direc-
tive required Member States to make the necessary frequencies
available. 97 In 1990, a similar approach was used for digital radio
paging ("ERMES") 9 s  and, in 1991, for digital cordless
("DECT").99
Other steps taken to advance mobile communication policy
include adoption by the Council, in 1993, of a Resolution Re-
quiring Cooperation on Radio Frequencies' 01 ("Radio Fre-
quency Resolution"). Moreover, the Commission's competition
directorate has encouraged each Member State to license a sec-
ond GSM operator. In 1993, the first common technical regula-
tions ("CTRs") were adopted, forming the basis for mutual rec-
ognition of type approval of GSM terminals. Finally, the Re-
search into Advanced Communications in Europe ("RACE")
mobile project was developed to conduct research on the third
generation market for personal communication technology,
UMTS.
b. The Mobile Green Paper
The Commission did not adopt a uniform approach to mo-
bile communication regulation until April 29, 1994, when it is-
sued a Green Paper on a Common Approach in the Field of Mo-
bile and Personal Communications in the European Union
("Mobile Green Paper").101 The Mobile Green Paper appeared
four months after the date forecast in the Council's Resolution
on the Review of the Situation in the Telecommunications Sec-
94. Council Recommendation No. 87/371, OJ. L 196/81 (1987) [hereinafter
GSM Recommendation].
95. Council Directive No. 87/372, OJ. L 196/85 (1987) [hereinafter GSM Direc-
tive].
96. GSM Recommendation, supra note 94, OJ. L 196/81, at 83 (1987).
97. GSM Directive, supra note 95, art. 1, OJ. L 196/85, at 87 (1987).
98. See Council Recommendation No. 90/543, O.J. L 310/23 (1990); see also Coun-
cil Directive 90/544, O.J. L 310/28 (1990).
99. See Council Recommendation No. 91/288, O.J. L 144/47 (1991); see also Coun-
cil Directive No. 91/287, O.J. L 144/45 (1991).
100. Council Resolution of 28June 1990, OJ. C 166/4 (1990) [hereinafter Radio
Frequency Resolution].
101. Mobile Green Paper, supra note 91.
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tor and the Need for Further Development in that Market
0 2
("Telecommunications Development Resolution"), and nearly
two years after the deadline for completion of the Single Market.
Nevertheless, it arrives at a time when it is recognized that the
development of mobile and personal communications is of piv-
otal importance to the future of the EG telecommunications in-
dustry. Moreover, the mobile sector draws on recent technologi-
cal, market, and policy advances to map new directions for the
entire telecommunications sector.
The Mobile Green Paper identifies the basic principles and
approaches needed to exploit the mobile sector's potential. In
addition, it initiates a dialogue among concerned organizations
that, in time, will enable the Commission to articulate a plan for
development of mobile and personal communications in the EC
and to identify the measures required to implement it. The
Commission proposes to adopt the same approach with mobile
communications as it did with the broader telecommunications
industry, that is, liberalization combined with harmonization.
To this end, barriers to development have been identified and
approaches to development suggested.
10 3
The major barriers to overcome are: (a) the existence of
exclusive and special rights that inhibit full-scale market develop-
ment and prevent equal access to market opportunities; (b)
technology-based licensing that causes market fragmentation;
(c) nationally-oriented licensing procedures that substantially
delay implementation of pan-European systems; (d) a frag-
mented approach to development and service provision that pre-
vents a global approach to the development of personal commu-
nications services; (e) the lack of established timetables for allo-
cating radio frequencies for new European technology; (g) the
Community's unfavorable response to U.S. initiatives for satel-
lite-based personal communications; (h) usage restrictions on
first and third party infrastructures and on infrastructure sharing
that hinder efficiency; (i) tariffs and price structures that inhibit
competition as micro-cellular systems progress towards mass per-
sonal communication services markets; and (j) barriers to Euro-
pean manufacturers' and operators' access to third country mar-
102. Council Resolution of 22 July 1993, OJ. C 213/1 (1993) [hereinafter Tele-
communications Development Resolution]. This resolution is discussed in Section
V(A) of this Article.
103. Mobile Green Paper, supra note 91.
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The Mobile Green Paper's main recommendation for over-
coming these barriers is to extend EC telecommunications prin-
ciples to the mobile sector, while maximizing commercial free-
dom.10°5 The paper makes several specific proposals.
First, the Mobile Green Paper seeks to abolish special rights
for mobile network operation, thereby introducing competition
and non-discretionary licensing. Mobile network operators and
independent service providers should be able to bid for con-
tracts to supply public telephone services via the fixed network.
Licensing restrictions should be limited to those already identi-
fied as essential in the Terminal Equipment, Services, Satellite
Earth Stations, and ONP Directives (e.g., reliability, interoper-
ability of services, data protection, user safety, employer safety,
and maintenance of network integrity).
Where systems are for public use, legitimate licensing condi-
tions could also include those public service requirements for-
mulated as trade restrictions identified in the Services Directive
(i.e., conditions for permanence, availability, and quality of the
service). Non-EC license applicants will be evaluated using the
same criteria if their home countries offer EC providers similar
market access.
The Mobile Green Paper does not specify a procedure for
granting licenses nor does it suggest that regulators limit the
number of market entrants. Irrespective of the method used,
however, the principle of mutual recognition for licenses must
apply to services and equipment.
The Mobile Green Paper's second proposal relates to the
provision of services. Provided that the EC competition rules are
observed, commercial freedom must be ensured by allowing ser-
vice providers to offer a combination of mobile services under
different licenses, using different technology, and operating in
the various Member States. This requires granting mutual rec-
ognition of licenses to provide services and approval of certifi-
cates for mobile terminal equipment. The Mobile Green Paper
also suggests establishing a code of conduct for service providers.
Third, the Mobile Green Paper proposes extending the
principles of interconnection, as defined under the ONP Direc-
104. Id. at 17-19.
105. Id. at 4-6.
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tive for connecting mobile communication networks to public
networks.' The same criteria of objectivity, transparency, and
non-discrimination should be applied to other technical and
commercial interfaces, particularly between service providers
and mobile network operators, as well as access to fixed intelli-
gent network functions, not presently covered by the directives.
Mobile operators should be allowed direct interconnection both
within a Member State and between states. Fourth, mobile net-
work operators should have freedom to establish their own infra-
structure, to use third-party infrastructures, and to share infra-
structures and sites.
Fifth, to ensure optimum use of the basic resources re-
quired by the sector, the Mobile Green Paper emphasizes the
need to complete the framework for frequency coordination. It
also proposes that the European Radio-Communications Com-
mittee ("ERC") and the European Bureau of Radio-communica-
tions ("EBR') should carry out works. Frequencies will be allo-
cated through objective, non-discriminatory, published criteria
and open procedures.
Furthermore, the Commission forecasts the need to allocate
mandatory common frequency bands for key personal commu-
nications systems, like UMT and LEO systems, through estab-
lished frequency allocation schedules and, for future systems, by
coordinated Community-level licensing procedures. Coordi-
nated numbering is also deemed necessary in order to reform
national numbering spaces and to achieve a European number-
ing space for personal communications. Special attention will
be paid to coordinating access codes for mobile and personal
communications systems, directory services, emergency and in-
formation services, and for developing intelligent networks.
Finally, the Commission proposes strengthening the posi-
tion of European industry, operators, and service providers by
developing uniform Community positions in relation to non-EC
countries. This would ensure market access to such countries
and continue support for the development of UMTS, the third
generation mobile systems. Because mobile policy involves far
more than simply licensing two operators in each area, the Mo-
bile Green Paper proves that much groundwork remains to be
done in the mobile sector. The Mobile Green Paper constitutes
106. Id-
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a major step towards adopting the global phased approach to
the telecommunications industry established in the Telecommu-
nications Development Resolution. 10 7 Moreover, it highlights
the sector's growth potential and its vital economic significance
for development of trans-European networks and EC communi-
cation and information infrastructures.
2. Liberalization at National Level
Some Member States have not yet met their obligation to
license a second mobile operator. Moreover, some regions
within the Community are not yet covered by GSM and some
services are unavailable beyond the national level. Germany has
been the most successful Member State with GSM, followed by
Portugal, France, and Greece. Only Germany and France, how-
ever, have signed interconnection agreements for roamingl us-
ing an access card to both countries' networks. In the United
Kingdom, the previously successful analogue duopoly has been
commuted to a GSM duopoly. Italy's second GSM telephone li-
cense was granted in April 1994. In Spain, Telef6nica has been
awarded the first license directly, while Airtel (a consortium led
by the United States' Airtouch Communications, British Tele-
communications, and Spain's Banco Santander and Banco Cen-
tral Hispano) was granted a second license in December 1994 by
means of open procedures. 109 Belgium, Ireland, Holland, and
Luxembourg continue to operate GSM monopolies.
The following chart" provides an overview of the current
Community GSM market.
107. Telecommunications Development Resolution, supra note 102. This resolu-
tion is discussed in Section V(A) of this Article.
108. Roaming denotes the capability to access a mobile communications system
anywhere in the Community, independent of the country and the mobile communica-
tions operator over whose network the connection is made, on the basis of a single
subscription to a service provider, usually in the subscriber's home country.
109. See Servidumbre de la Telfonia Mdvi, MUNDO, Jan. 4, 1995, at S.
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With regard to other digital mobile technology, DCS 1800111
services have already been launched in the United Kingdom and
Germany (France will grant a license this year), while DECT and
ERMES are only just arriving.
V. MONOPOLISTIC MARKETS: VOICE AND
INFRASTRUCTURE
The United Kingdom aside, voice telephony and infrastruc-
ture markets remain organized as monopolies in all Member
States. Measures adopted at the Community level are merely a
preparation for liberalization. This Article will now examine re-
cent Community proposals for monopolized markets and the
major developments likely to occur en route to full liberalization.
A. The 1992 Review
Although the Services and ONP Directives liberalized only
the regulation of data and value-added services, they provided
for a reassessment of public voice telephony regulation by
1992.112 The Commission completed this reassessment and ex-
panded upon the 1992 Review Communication."' The
amended communication included a comprehensive review of
the telecommunications industry and sparked a wide-ranging de-
bate on how best to develop the sector during the remainder of
the decade.
The 1992 Review Communication considered specific pro-
posals to liberalize the public voice telephony sector and to re-
consider the exemption of voice telephony services and infra-
structure markets from EC competition rules. The discussion fo-
cused on four possible courses of action: (a) freezing the
liberalization process and maintaining the status quo; (b) exten-
sively regulating tariffs and investments; (c) liberalizing all voice
telephony; and (d) the intermediate option of introducing com-
petition in voice telephony markets between Member States." 4
The Council endorsed this consultation process in a Decem-
111. DCS 1800 is the Digital Cellular System for the 1800 MHz European digital
cellular radio/personal communication network standard. It is based on GSM, but
upgraded for 1800 MHz operation.
112. See Services Directive, supra note 23; see also ONP Directive, supra note 30.
113. 1992 Review Communication, supra note 77, SEC (92) 1048 Final.
114. Id. at 24.
EC TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW
ber 17, 1992, meeting n1 5 and encouraged the Commission to
draft an additional communication. This became the Commis-
sion's 1993 Communication to the Council and European Parlia-
ment on the Consultation on the Review of the Situation in the
Telecommunications Service Sector'1 6 ("1993 Review Communi-
cation"), which formed the basis for the prominent Council Res-
olution on the Review of the Situation in the Telecommunica-
tions Sector and the Need for Further Development in that Mar-
ket" 7 with option four"18 selected for implementation to create
future telecommunications policy.
B. Prospective Liberalization Schedule
The Telecommunications Development Resolution sets Jan-
uary 1, 1998, as the date for full liberalization of voice telephony,
with derogations of two years for Luxembourg and Belgium, and
up to five years for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain." 9 This
liberalization applies to the provision of international, long-dis-
tance and local services. Therefore, the EC will become the first
market in the world to fully open up, all at once, to competition.
Member States granted derogation are unlikely to use the
full deferment period allowed them. Spain has already con-
firmed that it will liberalize its market in 1998.120 The remaining
Member States are also likely to liberalize their markets before
1998. Indeed, it is forecast that France will move quickly to open
its telephony market to competition.'
2
'
The Telecommunications Development Resolution sets Jan-
uary 1, 1995, as the date for publication of an infrastructure
green paper.' 22 The resolution also established an agenda for
further liberalization of the telecommunications sector. The
115. Council Resolution of 17 December 1992, OJ. C 2/5 (1993).
116. Communication to the Council and European Parliament on the Consulta-
tion on the Review of the Situation in the Telecommunications Service Sector, COM
(93) 159 Final (Apr. 1993) [hereinafter 1993 Review Communication].
117. Telecommunications Development Resolution, supra note 102.
118. Id., OJ. C 213/1, at 3 (1993).
119. Id.
120. See Ministerio de la Presidencia, Secretaria General del Portavoz del
Gobierno, Press Release, Oct. 7, 1994 (announcing that Spanish Council of Ministers
reached agreement that day on telecommunications policy).
121. France May Race to Telephony Competition, NEw MEDIA MARKETs, Nov. 4, 1993, at
9.
122. Telecommunications Development Resolution, supra note 102, OJ. C 213/1
(1993).
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measures encompassed were: adopting pending measures in the
ONP, satellite, and licensing fields; the Green Paper on Mobile
and Personal Communications; and the deadline of January 1,
1996, for submitting a comprehensive package of proposals to
introduce the necessary amendments to the Community's regu-
latory framework. 23
C. Challenges to Liberalization
With the Telecommunications Development Resolution in
place, the Community faces the following challenges to liberali-
zation: (a) multiple adjustments (i.e., Telecommunications Or-
ganization tariff structures, universal service obligations, and in-
terconnection); and (b) consolidating the existing regulatory
framework, adopting pending proposals, and accelerating infra-
structure liberalization.
1. Adjustment
As the telecommunications market becomes more dynamic
and less stable in the next few years, Europe's main concern will
be managing adjustment of the current regulatory framework,
specifically as it refers to tariff structures, universal service, and
interconnection.
a. Tariff Rebalancing
As the Commission recognized in its 1993 Review Commu-
nication, current Member State tariff structures hinder the de-
velopment of EC telecommunications. 124 Tariff distortions re-
sult from market distortions and monopolistic financial struc-
tures such as cross-subsidization.
All ONP directives have drawn on two essential principles:
first, establishing consistent Telecommunications Organization
cost-accounting systems and, second, structuring tariffs based on
costs. Nonetheless, price distortions persist. Intra-Community
and long-distance communication users face significant sur-
charges because both call and connection charges are approxi-
mately ten times higher than in the United States. 12  Excessively
high tariff-levels arise from cross-subsidization, that is, financial
123. Id.
124. 1993 Review Communication, supra note 116, COM (93) 159 Final, at 10-11.
125. 1992 Review Communication, supra note 77, SEC (92) 1048 Final, at 18-20.
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transfers from profitable intra-Community and long distance
lines to local services and universal service obligations (the Com-
mission estimates the current value of such transfers at sixteen
billion ECU). High tariffs also stem from a failure to adjust to
falling structure and equipment unit costs and from the frontier
effect.126 The result of the frontier effect is that, even where the
distances involved are similar, a three-minute peak-time call be-
tween Member States is more expensive than an internal na-
tional long-distance call. Moreover, within the EC, a call is often
more expensive in one direction than in the other. 27
Price distortion must be reduced prior to full liberalization
and especially prior to 1996, when the Commission will assess
structural adjustments made in order to formulate a new Com-
munity regulatory framework. Despite the almost four-year tran-
sition period, raising connection and local charges remains a
sensitive political area because it affects primary domestic users.
The Telecommunications Development Resolution stipu-
lates a coordination principle under which the Commission
must assist national regulatory authorities and operators in for-
mulating adjustment programs.' 28 Adjustment programs are
designed to focus especially on problems in peripheral regions
where network development is still in its initial stage of expan-
sion.' 29 The programs will focus on agreed accounting, cost allo-
cation, and transfer principles outlined by the Commission.8 0
At the national level, tariff restructuring is an important ele-
ment in preparing for market liberalization. Almost every Mem-
ber State has either begun to balance lower prices on interna-
tional and long-distance calls with increased charges for basic
connections and local calls, or has announced plans to do so.
Spain, for example, has adopted a comprehensive rebalancing
program to be implemented between now and the end of 1996.
Spain has already determined that local call prices will increase
sixty-three percent while there will be price decreases of forty
126. Prices of the most important services are controlled and overseen by 12 differ-
ent governments and national regulatory authorities. Moreover, specific additional cost
and particular demand conditions exist in each Member State.
127. 1992 Review Communication, supra note 77, SEC (92) 1048 Final, at 20.
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percent for installation, thirty-five percent for domestic long-dis-
tance calls, thirty-seven percent for international calls within the
Community, forty-five percent for non-Community international
calls, and forty-five percent for leased lines. Nevertheless, Spain
has yet to define precisely how these price changes will be
phased in. Furthermore, other Member States could reduce
prices by a further thirty-seven percent to forty-five percent, thus,
making international calls from Spain among the most expen-
sive in the EC.13 '
Once tariffs are adjusted, the success of telecommunications
operators in the EC market will depend greatly on efficiency.
This should promote the development of trans-European net-
works and services. High tariffs discourage use of telecommuni-
cations services, are a significant barrier to corporate communi-
cation, and impede innovation. They also divert telecommuni-
cations traffic from T.O.s to cheaper routes, usually via the
United States or Scandinavia using "least-cost routing" technol-
ogy connected to the public network or international leased
lines. Thus, if EC service providers do not reduce tariffs by 1998,
they may lose the market altogether.13 2
b. Universal Service
In its 1993 Review Communication, the Commission de-
fined the provision of universal services as "mak[ing] available a
defined minimum service of specified quality to all users at an
affordable price."'3 3 All Member States currently impose a
range of obligations on T.O.s and service providers to ensure the
provision of a minimum level of service throughout the Commu-
nity. Because they held a monopoly over voice services, T.O.s
could finance the provision of universal services with internal
131. Spain's U-turn Sparks Search for "New Model", PuB. NErWoRK EUR., May 1994, at
39, 42.
132. Over 20 companies have entered the call-back market in the last three years.
According to a Telechoice report, these companies generated US$120 million in reve-
nues in 1993.
In April 1994, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") granted
Viatel, Telegroup, and Discount Call International permission to provide code calling
services outside of the United States. The three companies, which had previously oper-
ated without licenses, were the first to be licensed for call-back services. The FCC ruling
is significant because it assures call-back providers that they are operating legally.
133. 1993 Review Communication, supra note 116, COM (93) 159 Final, at 21.
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revenue transfers without having to define the scope or actual
cost of the services.
In the newly-emerging competitive market environment,
universal service obligations are producing problems that re-
quire Community action. These include: (a) threats to the con-
tinued provision of universal services as traditional operators be-
come independent and constrained by the principles of cost-ori-
ented, transparent tariffs; (b) the need to establish mechanisms
for dividing universal service costs among all market competitors
to avoid competitive advantage and consequent competition dis-
tortion in an open market; and (c) establishing the universal ser-
vice obligation among Member States necessary to create an
open Community-wide telecommunications services market,
while permitting states to impose additional domestic obliga-
tions where they do not create entry barriers.
These problems increase the need for the Community to
define the important elements of universal service and to sug-
gest how these services should be financed. Thus, the Commis-
sion has already published a Communication on Universal Ser-
vice' ("Universal Service Communication") that attempts to
balance the introduction of competition by 1998 and the July
1994 Council Resolution"3 5 with the European Parliament's
("Parliament") mandate on maintaining universal service.136
The Council formally, but only partially, adopted the Uni-
versal Service Communication's proposals in February 1994 by
adopting a Resolution on Universal Service Principles in the
Telecommunications Sector."" Essentially, the Council Resolu-
tion states that operators may fund loss-making services by cross-
subsidization from profitable activities or by access fees.13 8 The
Council thus permits Member States flexibility in defining the
134. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parlia-
ment and the Economic and Social Committee Developing Universal Service for Tele-
communications in a Competitive Environment, Proposal for a Council Resolution on
Universal Service Principles in the Telecommunications Sector, COM (93) 543 Final
(Nov. 1993) [hereinafter Universal Service Communication].
135. Telecommunications Development Resolution, supra note 102, O.J. C 213/1
(1993) (setting forth as major objective liberalization of all public voice telephony serv-
ices while maintaining universal service).
136. EuRoPEAN PARLAMErNT, IUBERAUZACION DE LAS TELECOMMUNICACIONES,
TAR1FAS Y ESTRUTURA DE PEcios, Docs. A3-117, 113/93 (Apr. 19, 1993) (Spanish text).
137. Council Resolution of 7 February 1994, OJ. C 48/1 (1994).
138. Id., OJ. C 48/1, at 2 (1993).
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scope of universal service. Germany, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom, however, wished to restrict the scope of cross-
subsidization and to limit financial transfers to voice telephony
alone, thus excluding data and digital circuit services.'
39
Contrary to what the Universal Service Communication rec-
ommended, the Council did not retain the elements established
within the ONP framework (i.e., access rights/interconnection,
mandatory or desirable minimum service standards, dispute res-
olution mechanisms, public service features, tariff principles,
etc.140 ) as basic elements of the Community definition of univer-
sal service. This was because it was considered necessary to fur-
ther examine the concept of universal service. It remains to be
determined, for example, whether the scope of universal services
should be limited to voice telephony alone, whether the obliga-
tion to provide such services should apply to T.O.s alone, and
what level of specificity is needed in defining compensatory
methods.
Further study and discussion is required to reevaluate the
universal service obligation and how it will be financed. Thus,
the Commission plans to hold consultations with users, opera-
tors, and regulators in June andJuly of 1994 before finalizing its
proposals. These proposals will certainly include a timetable for
implementing changes to the universal service obligation.
c. Interconnection
Interconnection agreements establish conditions under
which service providers and network operators interconnect
their facilities.' 4 ' Interconnection possibilities are constantly in-
creasing and, thus, becoming important as world-wide use of in-
tegrated services expands (e.g., mobile to fixed to specialized sat-
ellite to paging; international to national to local; circuit-
switched to packet-switched to frame relay). The possible con-
figurations and corresponding complexities of interconnection
increase daily.
Because construction of suitable networks is often economi-
cally and legally unfeasible, the cost and degree of interconnec-
tion are crucial factors for the viability of newly provided serv-
139. Id.
140. Universal Service Communication, supra note 134, COM (93) 543 Final, at 7.
141. 1993 Review Communication, supra note 116, COM (93) 159 Final, at 23.
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ices. There is a consensus that the ONP framework is the most
appropriate for developing interconnection principles.1 42 An
EC directive on interconnection, and on the funding of univer-
sal service, will be published at the end of 1996.
The ONP Proposal contains an initial framework including:
(a) the right to equitable non-discriminatory network access; 43
(b) adherence to European technical standards; 44 (c) recourse
to the ONP Committee if the national regulatory authorities can-
not resolve disputes;145 (d) numbering plans;146 and (e) justifi-
able cost-oriented interconnection charges that may apply to in-
terconnection between T.O.s147 and to special network access.
148
Recognizing the essential role of access charges in ensuring
that universal service is maintained and developed, and in facili-
tating the transition towards cost-oriented tariffs, the Commis-
sion permits access charges for T.O. interconnection only when
one party is constrained by regulatory obligations, such as price
controls and universal service obligations. 49 These charges,
however, must be justified, cost-oriented, non-discriminatory,
and approved by the relevant national regulatory authority.
T.O.s may be reimbursed for costs incurred in providing re-
quired special network access to service providers. 50 The spe-
cific conditions of interconnection agreements must be negoti-
ated by the incumbent parties within this framework, which, to-
gether with the EC competition rules, should be sufficient to




143. ONP Proposal, supra note 36, art. 3, OJ. C 263/20, at 24 (1992), as amended at
oJ. C 147/12, at 14 (1993).
144. Id. art. 22, oJ. C 263/20, at 29 (1992), as amended at OJ. C 147/12, at 18
(1993).
145. Id. arts. 25-29, O.J. C 263/20, at 30-31 (1992), as amended at OJ. C 147/12, at
20 (1993).
146. Id. art. 20, OJ. C 263/20, at 27-28 (1992).
147. Id. art. 10, o.J. C 263/20, at 25-26 (1992), as amended at OJ. C. 147/12, at 17
(1993).
148. Id. art. 9, OJ. C 263/20, at 25 (1992), as amended at OJ. C 147/12, at 16-17
(1993).
149. Id. art. 10, OJ. C 263/20, at 25-26 (1992), as amended at OJ. C 147/12, at 17
(1993).
150. Id. art. 11, OJ. C 263/20, at 26 (1992), as amended at OJ. C 147/12, at 17
(1993).
151. Id. art. 10, OJ. C 263/20, at 25-26 (1992), as amended at OJ. C 147/12, at 17
(1993); see 1993 Review Communication, supra note 116, COM (93) 159 Final, at 24.
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2. Infrastructure Liberalization
Full liberalization of the EC telecommunications industry
will be achieved in a number of related ways. Consolidating the
existing regulatory framework by faithful and effective national
implementation of Community rules will advance liberalization.
So too will the adoption of pending proposals on ONP, satellites,
and mutual recognition of national licenses for specific satellite
and telecommunications services. A prerequisite for progress,
however, is the liberalization of telecommunications infrastruc-
tures.
a. Current Situation
The United Kingdom is currently the only Member State
that has liberalized its infrastructure market.' Monopolies in
the other Member States have resulted in leased lines prices that
are significantly higher than in the United States. Moreover,
price structures differ substantially from state to state within the
Community.
Because network access is a prerequisite to the provision of
services and accounts for over half of carrier expenses, the cur-
rent state of the infrastructure market deters investors and cre-
ates a competitive disadvantage for EC firms. For European op-
erators to succeed, they must have access to quality networks at
competitive prices.
T.O.s strongly resist infrastructure liberalization because it
could significantly impair their financial equilibrium. Nonethe-
less, infrastructure liberalization is essential to eliminate market
distortions and to allow services liberalization to produce the de-
sired effects. Rapidly liberalizing infrastructure markets would
also eliminate the scarcity of high-capacity leased lines within the
Community. If it persists, this scarcity could seriously endanger
the European telecommunications industry, which requires the
high-capacity lines to develop trans-European networks and so-
phisticated telecommunications services like multimedia. Alter-
native infrastructure, such as that owned by railroad public utili-
ties, and cable-television infrastructure have considerable poten-
tial and, thus, should be exploited.
152. The United Kingdom permitted Mercury, its second most important telecom-
munications services provider after BT, to provide alternative leased lines in the mid-
1980s and is currently granting licenses to other alternative infrastructure providers.
EC TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW
b. Accelerating Infrastructure Liberalization
The Telecommunications Development Resolution did not
establish a fixed date for the liberalization of public infrastruc-
ture, although it did commit the Commission to publish a Green
Paper on this field before January 1995.15s Member States may
independently introduce infrastructure competition, and it ap-
pears that Holland will be first to do so. In March 1994, the
Parliament passed an "Outline Memorandum" 154 that proposed
introducing competition in the fixed infrastructure market by
1995 by granting licenses for specific existing licensed private in-
f-astructure to be made available to third parties.'
55
The Commission is presently calling for the speedy liberali-
zation of EC infrastructure. Directorate General XIII (telecom-
munications) and Directorate General IV (competition) are cur-
rently collaborating to accelerate action on alternative and cable
infrastructure for non-voice telephony services. Within this con-
text, the Green Paper on the Liberalization of Telecommunica-
tions Infrastructure and Cable TV Networks1 56 ("Infrastructure
Green Paper") and Draft Directive on Cable-TV Networks'5 7
("Cable Draft Directive") were prepared.
i. Infrastructure Green Paper
Part One of the Green Paper was submitted to the Telecom-
munication's Council on November 17, 1994, and is intended to
help establish basic principles for infrastructure liberalization.
In particular, it proposes that a coherent approach, integrated
into the framework provided by the Telecommunications Devel-
opment Resolution, 5 ' is required.
59
153. Telecommunication Development Resolution, supra note 102, OJ. C 213/1,
at 3 (1993).
154. See Dan de Vries, Remarks at the Fifth Annual Seminar on Telecommunica-
tion Services and Competition Law in Europe (Apr. 14, 1994) (available from Author)
(discussing Outline Memorandum).
155. Id.
156. Green Paper on the Liberalization of Telecommunications Infrastructure and
Cable TV Networks: Part I, COM (94) 440 Final [hereinafter Infrastructure Green Pa-
per].
157. The Draft Directive on Cable-TV Networks ("Cable Draft Directive") is unpub-
lished.
158. Telecommunications Development Resolution, supra note 102.
159. The Infrastructure Green Paper states: "[I]nfrastructure liberalization should
be linked to the timetable for the full liberalization of telecommunications services,
including both services which are currently open to competition and those to be
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Furthermore, the Infrastructure Green Paper proposes the fol-
lowing two-stage timetable16 ° for infrastructure liberalization.
Schedule for Telecommunication Services
and Infrastructure Liberalisation
Services Infrastructures
Services open Proposed date for Full liberalization
to competition lifting constraints of new tele-
on the use of communications
existing alternative infrastructure (incl.
infrastructures 161  licensing new
(incl. cable TV infrastructure
networks) operators)
Data and other Since 1990 1995 1998
non-voice
communications





Satellite Since 1994 July 1, 1995 1998
communications
Mobile Under way 1995 1998
communications
Public voice January 1, 1998
telephony 1998
Having examined Part One of the Infrastructure Green Pa-
per, the Telecommunications Council approved, in principle, a
compromise resolution ("Telecommunications Council Resolu-
tion"), yet to be adopted, providing for liberalization of telecom-
munications infrastructure supply on January 1, 1998, with tran-
sitional periods for some Member States. The resolution does
not provide for early liberalization of alternative infrastructures,
however, because several Member States opposed such a provi-
opened to competition by 1 January 1998, i.e. voice telephony services for the general
public." Infrastructure Green Paper, supra note 156, at 10.
160. See Infrastructure Green Paper, supra note 156, at 39.
161. Any infrastructure authorised in Member States and operated by others than
the incumbent telecommunications operator
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sion. 162
The Commission will submit Part Two of the Infrastructure
Green Paper to the Council and European Parliament early in
1995. Part Two will address the following issues: (a) selecting
criteria for the future licensing of infrastructure; (b) maintain-
ing and further developing universal service and other public
services; (c) determining the interconnection regime applicable
in a competitive environment; (d) reviewing restrictions on in-
cumbent operators and clarifying the application of competition
rules; (e) ensuring comparable and effective access to third
country markets. Part Two will also consider the convergence
between telecommunications and broadcasting, and will address
the impact of liberalization on the environment, employment,
and society at large. Finally, Part Two will consider the specific
circumstances of Member States with less developed networks
(i.e., Spain, Greece, Ireland, Portugal) or very small networks
(i.e., Luxembourg)."'
ii. Cable Draft Directive
Directorate General IV's purpose in elaborating the Cable
Draft Directive164 is to increase the infrastructure available for
cable television services and to allow cable operators to offer lib-
eralized telecommunications services as a means of generating
greater competition in the cable field. Despite significant dis-
agreements between Member States that impede elaboration of
the Cable Draft Directive, EC Competition Commissioner Karel
Van Miert has confirmed that, in the light of the Telecommuni-
cations Council Resolution's compromise, the Cable Draft Direc-
tive has not been abandoned. 65
Sources close to Directorate General IV indicate that, to
avoid restrictions on competition, the Cable Draft Directive
would deny T.O.s exclusive licenses to operate cable television
infrastructures in areas where they monopolize telecommunica-
tions infrastructures. Moreover, competition problems could
arise under Article 86 of the EC Treaty 66 in Member States
where T.O.s control most of the existing cable infrastructure
162. EU/Telecommunications, EuL, No. 6360, Nov. 19 1994, at 5.
163. Infrastructure Green Paper, supra note 156, at 38.
164. See supra note 157 (noting that Cable Draft Directive is unpublished).
165. EU/Teecommunications, supra note 162, at 6.
166. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 86.
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and, accordingly, the Commission will include solutions for such
problems if a future directive is adopted in this area.
Devising solutions for potential Article 86 competition
problems is important because, in many States, one T.O. con-
trols much of the cable infrastructure. For example, in France,
France T6lcom owns over half the infrastructure through its
Plan Cable franchises. Tele Danmark controls a comparable
proportion of Danish infrastructure, while DBP Telekom con-
trols ninety percent of German infrastructure, and PTT, twenty
percent of Dutch.
Although Spain, like Italy, Greece, and Portugal, has
scarcely begun to develop cable television infrastructures, it will
soon pass a cable television bill promoting broadband network
installation. The bill would authorize Telef6nica to provide
cable television services in municipally-based service regions that
fully respect local corporation and autonomous community au-
thorities. Telef6nica would use the basic telephone service infra-
structure to transform the telephone network into a multimedia
services network. In addition, the bill would authorize an in-
dependent operator, selected in a bidding process from which
Telef6nica is excluded, to provide services and would grant this
operator exclusive authorization to build the necessary infra-
structure in the region. Finally, the bill would authorize the pro-
vision of services by an undefined number of operators who do
not possess their own networks. This group would use Telef6n-
ica's infrastructure or that of the independent service provider.
The Spanish bill conforms with the Cable Draft Directive.
Specifically, it prohibits Telef6nica from exclusively controlling
infrastructure and creates a major investment opportunity for
telecommunications operators.
British cable operators are already permitted to provide
telecommunications services. The so-called 1991 Telecommuni-
cations White Paper, 67 however, does prevent British Telecom-
munications ("BT") from carrying broadcast-type services on its
main network until 1998, and from providing such a service
before 2001. The United Kingdom cable industry is already ex-
panding quickly and new broadband cable systems are being in-
167. U.K. DEP'T OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, COMPETITION AND CHOICE: TELECOMMU-
NICATIONS POLICY FOR THE 1990S (Mar. 1991) [hereinafter Telecommunications White
Paper].
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stalled. According to the British Cable Television Authority,
cable operators, in 1994 alone, invested some £1.5 billion into
building networks.
iii. Priority Questions Ancillary to Liberalization of
Infrastructure
The Bangemann Group, a gathering of the preeminent Eu-
ropean telecommunications and consumer electronics indus-
tries, has highlighted priority questions ancillary to infrastruc-
ture liberalization. The Bangemann Group's purpose was to ad-
vise the Community on building information superhighways but
it has also examined the infrastructure issue. The results of the
Bangemann Group's investigation underline the need to accel-
erate the liberalization process and to establish a common regu-
latory framework for protecting intellectual property rights, pri-
vacy, and information security.'
68
iv. Progress on Infrastructure Liberalization: Impact on
MultiMedia Development
These measures may significantly promote the develop-
ment, in Europe, of multimedia services and other advanced
services requiring broadband networks.
The advent of multimedia communication marks the dawn
of a communications era in which everyone will have easy and
immediate access to widely distributed information and comput-
ing sources in a panoply of forms including voice, text, data,
sound, graphics, images, and full-motion video. Digital Video,
the all-digital approach to video processing, storage, and trans-
mission, is the technological advance that will make multimedia
communication a reality.
As the mid-1990's approach, business imperatives will pro-
vide the initial impetus for multimedia development. Consumer
applications, however, will not have an impact until the end of
the decade. Thus, it is essential to rapidly remove legal barriers,
like the infrastructure monopoly, that still hinder multimedia
development. Commission action in this area is sure to en-
courage telecommunications, media, and personal computing
168. EU/White Paper, Eua, No. 6242, June 2, 1994, at 9.
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businesses to combine their complementary skills to provide
multimedia services in Europe.
D. Globalization Challenges
The globalization of the telecommunications market is a re-
sult of economic globalization, telecommunications market lib-
eralization, and technological innovation. To increase the vol-
ume of their international business, firms must have access to
telecommunications systems that can deliver voice, data, and im-
age services internationally. Moreover, where the business con-
ducted is multinational in nature, large-scale clients may select
corporate telecommunications providers without reference to
their nationality. EC operators must adopt a more business-like
approach if they wish to deal successfully with changes in the
telecommunications market and exploit emerging investment
opportunities in the area. Furthermore, to maintain control of
the telecommunications industry as it is globalized, the EC must
proceed rapidly towards constructing a Community-wide market
and a new trans-European network, enabling Europe-wide provi-
sion of the most advanced telecommunications services.
1. Telecommunications Organization Adaptation and Strategy
The transition from homogeneous national regulation to-
wards an "open" Community regulatory framework or, in other
words, from monopoly towards a competitive international mar-
ket, is forcing European T.O.s to redesign their organizational
structures and strategies. The T.O.s are also reacting to the esca-
lating rate of technological progress and the resulting increase
in services that must be provided, phenomena that encourage
rather risky investments.
T.O.s' initial organizational changes were the separation of
telecommunications regulation and operations, the adoption of
more commercial accounting principles, and privatization. The
realities of globalization then required operators to enter into
interconnection agreements and strategic alliances. This Article
will now present an overview of adaptation methods employed
by some representative European T.O.s.
a. British Telecommunications ("BT")
The United Kingdom has always been at the forefront of
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telecommunications liberalization. Consequently, BT is clearly
the European T.O. with the most experience operating in a der-
egulated market. Predictably, it is also the forerunner in reor-
ganization.
BT was privatized and quoted on the stock market in 1984.
At present, the government of the United Kingdom is a 21.8%
shareholder. BT's 1991 structural reorganization resulted in a
substantial work-force reduction. Between 1984 and 1991, BT
worked on digitalizing it's network and improving its service.
BT's reorganizational package, "Project Sovereign," focused
on meeting customer needs and creating a leaner organization
by cutting approximately forty thousand jobs, five thousand of
which were in middle-management. Today, the company is
structured to cater to three main customer groups: personal,
business, and "special business" (mobile communications, opera-
tor services, yellow pages, and visual and broadcast services).
"Products and Services Management" oversee BT's product port-
folio, and the "Worldwide Networks" department, which is subdi-
vided into international and domestic networks, provides net-
works on a worldwide scale.
In April 1994, BT's alliance with the U.S. corporation, MCI,
led BT to alter its Management Division's "Business Communica-
tions" and "Products and Services" in order to concentrate more
on the "Global Business" division. The BT/MCI alliance, con-
sisted essentially of two transactions: first, BT's acquisition of a
twenty percent stake in MCI and, second, the creation of the co-
owned joint venture, NewCo. BT and MCI transferred their ex-
isting business and facilities to NewCo, which is geared to pro-
vide business customers with global value-added/enhanced tele-
communications services. NewCo will build a global network to
provide these services, which will be sold exclusively to its parent
companies. MCI will be the sole distributor of NewCo products
in the United States, while BT will distribute the products else-
where.
The Commission has issued a decision in the BT/MCI case
that is believed to define Commission policy governing strategic
alliances in the telecommunications field.169 According to the
Commission's view, the sale of shares does not violate Article 85
of the EC Treaty and, thus, is granted negative clearance, while
169. Commission Decision No. 94/579/EC, OJ. L 223/36 (1994).
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other parts of the transaction are granted an exemption. Essen-
tially, the Commission favors alliance agreements that contribute
to the provision of a European-wide telecommunications service
and that are likely to meet the growing needs of powerful inter-
national consumers.
BT is seeking corporate buyers for NewCo services outside
of North America. The company will secure network capacity to
provide these services by: (a) independently building up leased-
line networks from scratch; (b) purchasing stakes in private net-
works in different countries; (c) buying into local operators with
existing customer bases; and (d) offering distributorships.
In Spain, the only EC market in which BT has gone into
partnership, BT has taken the private-network route. In Norway,
BT has entered into an agreement whereby Norwegian Telecom
will distribute NewCo services. BT has a similar agreement with
Telecom Eireann, the state-owned Irish T.O. There is specula-
tion that BT will become a partner of Stet, the Italian State hold-
ing company, and that it will also acquire a stake in Belgacom,
the Belgium state-owned operator.
In France and Germany, Europe's two largest markets, BT
will have to take the private network route or build a network
from scratch because neither France T6lcom (or "FT") nor
Deutsche Bundespost Telekom (or "DBP") are likely to sell their
major competitor a stake. Furthermore, in December 1993, FT
and DBP proposed the creation of a joint venture to compete
with BT. BT, however, is already installing switches and building
leased-line network infrastructures in France and Germany and
is seeking to acquire shares in private networks.
b. France T6lcom and Deutsche Bundespost Telekom
Partly because they operate in different market environ-
ments, France T6lcom and Deutsche Bundespost Telekom have
chosen a different path to liberalization than BT, their main ri-
val in Europe. It was not until 1991, that France T6lcom al-
tered its legal structure from that of a public administration to
that of an "etablissement public d caract~re industriel et commercial,"
an institution under public law. 7 ° Despite this change, however,
170. Rudolph Pospischil, Reorganization of European Telecommunications: The Cases of
British Telecom, France Tigcom and Deutsche Telekom, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'Y 603, 605
(Nov. 1993).
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FT's current legal form as an independent company operating
under government ownership and control lacks flexibility. For
instance, it impedes the firm's ability to form alliances. Never-
theless, it is expected that France T616com will be subject to lim-
ited capitalization."7' FT is organized more along divisional lines
and less along functional lines than BT. Moreover, unlike with
BT, FT's international, national, and local networks are man-
aged by different organizational units.
DBP remains a public administration and is less functionally
organized than BT. DBP's market, like BT's, is divided into resi-
dential and business sectors, but, unlike BT, DBP has separate
domestic and international networks. Plans to partially privatize
DBP indicate that its transformation from government agency to
public stock corporation will take place onJanuary 1, 1995. The
first public stock offering (believed to be twenty-five percent)
would occur in 1996, with a further offering of 24.9% in 1998. It
is unlikely that privatization of the government's remaining ma-
jority shareholding would occur before 1999.172
The strategies employed by France T6lcom and DBP
Telekom to prepare for market globalization are inherently dif-
ferent from those used by BT. For example, unlike BT, FT and
DBP did not select U.S. partners but, instead, joined forces in
the late 1980's in an effort to dominate the European telecom-
munications markets. Their first alliance saw the creation of
Eucom, a provider of Value Added Network Services ("VANS").
Then, in March 1992, the Paris-based Eunetcom was founded to
concentrate on specific markets like the outsourcing market and
on meeting the telecommunications needs of multinationals.
The latest Franco-German collaboration occurred on De-
cember 8, 1993, in Brussels, with the signing of a "Memorandum
of Understanding.""73 This document commits both parties to
create another joint venture to integrate their national activities
in the following areas: (a) data network services, including
packet-switched data services on the basis of X.25 standards,
171. France Telecom President Backs Structural Reform, Capitalization, TRI, July 23,
1993, at 7; Germany's Telecom Privatization Proceeding Apace, Minister Says, Apr. 15, 1994,
at 2.
172. Germany's Telecom Privatization Proceeding Apace, Minister Says, supra note 171,
at 2.
173. See Franco-German Pact to Break the Mould, PUB. NErwoRK EuR., Feb. 1994, at 13
(discussing French and German carriers commitment to form historic joint venture).
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frame relay, and other criteria; (b) international leased lines; (c)
virtual private networks ("VPN"); (d) value-added services
("VAS"); (e) Very Small Satellite Terminal operations ("VSAT");
(f) core backbone networks with standardized network manage-
ment systems for VAS; and (g) other services, including the de-
velopment of a joint platform for intelligent networks with stan-
dardized interfaces.
The Memorandum of Understanding increases operator co-
operation beyond the scope of Eunetcom, which will become a
division of the new joint venture. Moreover, sources indicate
that France T6lcom will sell a portion of its own stock to
Deutsche Bundespost Telecom.
Despite all their cooperation, however, there is evidence
that FT and DBP remain rivals. In Budapest, in December 1993,
for example, each carrier independently sought to acquire a
thirty percent equity stake in the Hungarian T.O. Nevertheless,
their alliances will almost certainly weaken competition in the
EC telecommunications market and may force EC and national
competition authorities to intervene.
Outside the Community, FT and DBP's primary market ex-
pansion is in Central and Eastern Europe. In the United States,
the two carriers have agreed to acquire jointly a twenty percent
stake in Sprint Corporation for US$4.2 billion. This acquisition
will constitute the largest global telecommunications alliance to
date, joining the two biggest European T.O.s with the United
States's third largest long-distance operator.174
c. Telef6nica
Peculiarities in the Spanish telecommunications market dic-
tate the strategies and organizational structure of Telef6nica, the
partially state-owned national operator. Until April 1994, the
carrier monopolized all sectors of the Spanish telecommunica-
tions market, except for paging and a few international resale
services. Under its new competition policy for telecommunica-
tions, Spain's first concern is to license a second mobile opera-
tor. Cable will be the next offering, followed by voice liberaliza-
tion. In November 1993, the Ministry of Transport granted four
licenses for national data network operators.
174. France Telecom &Deutsche Telekom: Nigociation avec Sprint, EUR., No. 7025,June
9, 1994, at 17.
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Although Spain, as a peripheral EC region, was permitted to
delay introduction of full competition until 2003, it appears,
much to the Finance Ministry's dismay, that the Spanish tele-
communications market will be fully open to competition before
then. The Spanish Government's planned sale of its twenty-four
percent stake in Telef6nica Internacional, a Telef6nica subsidi-
ary that provides its services overseas, will be the state's only act
of privatization. The government will also maintain an indirect
interest in Telef6nica Internacional through its thirty-three per-
cent stake in Telef6nica, which owns the remaining seventy-six
percent of the subsidiary.175
Thus, it is apparent that telecommunications liberalization
has progressed slowly in Spain and that Telef6nica is only now
developing the tools needed to function in a competitive mar-
ket. Having finally provided basic telephone lines to most of the
650,000 customers waiting for service, Telef6nica's most pressing
task is to rebalance telecommunications tariffs to reflect costs.
While Spain's local rates are among the cheapest in the EC, its
domestic long-distance rates are among the most costly and its
international tariffs are currently the highest.
Telef6nica must also provide more customer service con-
tracts. At present, the company's only such contract offers cus-
tomers a free handset where it fails to install a telephone line
within fifteen days after it is requested. No compensation exists,
however, for failures on leased lines or delays in delivering new
services. Greater progress is also required in providing detailed
customer billing, which Telef6nica is only now introducing.
Despite these shortcomings, substantial investment in
Telef6nica has facilitated Spain's recent entry into Europe's tele-
communications elite. In 1993, Telef6nica had pre-tax profits of
107.5 billion pesetas, a 7.8% increase from 1992; net profits
amounted to 84.7 billion pesetas. Operating revenues rose 1222
billion pesetas on the year, an 5.7% increase from 1992. Public
telephony and mobile services, with revenues up twenty-five per-
cent on 1992, were major growth areas. Telef6nica also reaped
success from its considerable efforts to move into foreign mar-
kets. In 1993, international profits of some US$157 million ac-
175. Spain May Trade Overseas Stake for Multimedia and Mobile Skills, FIN. TECH.
TELEcom MKr., Mar. 17, 1994, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curews File.
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counted for almost a quarter of Telef6nica's total profits.
176
Telef6nica, with an overseas strategy focused on Latin
America, holds equity stakes in Puerto Rico, Venezuela, Chile,
Argentina, and Peru. It is also likely that Telef6nica will secure
further holdings in upcoming Nicaraguan and Bolivian telecom-
munications privatizations and, thus, substantially complete its
trans-continental Latin American network. Telef6nica also owns
a twenty-five percent interest in Hispassat, the Spanish national
satellite operator, and plans to use it to link its Spanish network
with its Latin American operation.
To establish a foothold in the multimedia sector and to en-
hance its appeal to prospective partners, Telef6nica is currently
seeking to enter the U.S. market through local link-ups with me-
dium-sized U.S. firms. In Europe, Telef6nica Internacional has
only two significant interests: first, a sixty percent holding in
Telef6nica Romania, which operates Romania's analogue cellu-
lar network and, second, a minority stake in Contactel, a paging
network operator in Portugal. Telef6nica has boosted its stature
in Europe, however, through a 1994 agreement with Unisource
and its three holding companies, PTT Telecom Netherlands,
Swiss PTr Telecom, and Telia of Sweden. The agreement pro-
vides opportunities to develop data communications, satellite
services, corporate networks, and mobile communications.
d. Belgacom
Situated in the heart of Europe, Belgium is a lucrative mar-
ket still in the initial phases of liberalization. The country has
not yet licensed a second GSM operator and has a two-year dero-
gation from the 1998 deadline for services liberalization.
In 1991, RTT, the Belgian state-owned telecommunications
monopoly, was reestablished as a one hundred percent state-
owned independent company and renamed Belgacom. Belgisch
Instituut voor Postdiendensten en Telecommunicatie, a regula-
tory body, was established after Belgacom was created, but took
over two years to become fully operational.' A 1992 manage-
ment contract between Belgacom and the Belgian government
outlined Belgacom's goals. These goals included the formula-
176. TELEF6NICA, 1993 ANNuAL REPORT (1994).
177. Belgium Implements R7T Breakup Into Carrer, Regulatory Ageny, TRI, June 12,
1992, at 8.
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tion of guidelines for tariff rebalancing and for improving ser-
vice by expediting repairs and new connections. The contract
also provided for the acceleration of network digitalization and
the provision of intelligent network services. Belgacom's success
in realizing these objectives will provide a strong indication of
how it will adapt to competitive market conditions.
The Belgian government has recently authorized a plan to
privatize Belgacom, which has a work-force of 26,000 and re-
ported revenues of US$3.04 billion in 1993. The plan calls for
converting Belgacom into a publicly-held company (Soci~t6
Anonyme-Ltd), selling off as much as forty-nine percent of its
equity, and establishing separate subsidiaries for mobile tele-
phone services and telephone directory publishing."' 8 Potential
investors are rumored to include France T6lcom and DBP
Telekom, BT and AT&T, and the Unisource joint venture. The
deadline for offers passed on May 2, 1994.179
With its U.S. and Singapore offices already offering custom-
ers a wide range of services, Belgacom's overseas strategy is tak-
ing shape. The operator has also bought a stake in Combellga, a
firm that provides international services to and from Moscow.
Belgacom's next step is likely to be the formation of an alliance
with another carrier. Its overall strategy may be to form partner-
ships in each of its operational areas. Belgacom has already
done this in the GSM field where it joined with Pactel to launch
Dubbed Proximus, a GSM service, on January 1, 1994.
e. Privatization
Privatization is of major importance to future investment in
the telecommunications market. Nevertheless, Member State
T.O.s have had telecommunications monopolies for many years
and are very likely to retain a high market share long after priva-
tization. Thus, T.O.s will enjoy a competitive advantage over ri-
val operators well into the future. At present, then, newly-priva-
tized T.O.s appear to provide better investment opportunities
than do their competitors.18 0 Thus, investors should pay careful
attention to the T.O. privatizations already discussed and to
178. Belgian Government Approves Plan for PrivatizingBelgacom, TRI, Apr. 15, 1994, at
8.
179. Privatisation de Belgacom: 80 Sociitis Sont Intdressges, EuL TELECOM, Apr. 25,
1994, at 6.
180. For example, it has taken Mercury, the United Kingdom's second most im-
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planned privatizations of T.O.s like Tele-Danmark, Stet, and Por-
tugal Telecom.
Tele-Danmark, the Danish state telecommunications mo-
nopoly, is selling 48.3% of its shares, valued at some US$2.7 bil-
lion. It is expected that over eighty percent of the sixty-three
million shares being offered will be sold outside Denmark, mak-
ing the privatization one of the largest international equity issues
ever. The offer will be realized in five tranches: Scandanavia,
the United States, the United Kingdom, continental Europe,
and the rest of the world. Although the Danish government will
retain a controlling fifty-one percent stake in Tele-Danmark, the
reformed undertaking will enjoy operational independence.18 1
Stet, Italy's state-owned holding telecommunications com-
pany, is controlled by Iri, the state industrial holding group, and
will initially run Telecom Italia, the new Italian telephone opera-
tor. Telecom Italia was created by a merger of Sip, Italy's state-
controlled domestic telephone operator, and Italy's four other
public carriers: the international operators, Italcable and Iritel;
the satellite operator, Telespazio; and the maritime communica-
tions company, Sirma.18 2
Plans to privatize Stet were announced prior to Italy's last
general election. It was forecast that Iri would sell part of its
fifty-three percent stake in Stet in late 1994 or early 1995, while
retaining special powers over key decisions. It was also believed
that Stet would reduce its stake in Telecom Italia to below fifty
percent some time in 1995. After the Italian elections, Prime
Minister Silvio Berlusconi stated in the Italian Parliament that,
although no privatization timetable had been fixed, he wished to
accelerate the privatization process. He intended to sell all of
Iri's shares in Stet in the near future, while maintaining decisive
influence over Stet's key.18 3
In Portugal, in June 1994, three state entities, TLP,
Telecom, and TD, merged, to form Portugal Telecom. Approxi-
mately twenty-five percent of its shares will be sold in 1995. The
portant services provider, a long time to capture market share from BT despite having
well-established capabilities in interconnection, tariffing, and other functions.
181. Tele-Danmark Privitization Plan, TRI, Apr. 15, 1994, at 9.
182. Telecom Italia Will be the Sixth Largest Telco in the World, FIN. TEcH. TELECOM
MKT., Apr. 14, 1994, at 1.
183. Italie: La STETPourrait tre Privatise Plus t6t que Prhu, EUR. T.LEcoM, May 24,
1994, at 7.
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Portuguese privatization strategy is to create a single operator
that will then sell shares to private operators. Strategic alliances
are also a major government objective. It is expected that Portu-
gal will finalize its privatization decree by October 1994.184
2. Developing Trans-European Networks
Thus far, trans-European networks for voice telephony serv-
ices have developed in a fragmented manner. Data and image
networks are presently developing only at the national level, but
will be interconnected eventually to form Europe-wide networks.
Market fragmentation and the scarcity of high-bandwidth capac-
ity infrastructure could seriously undermine the European tele-
communications industry. These problems impede the provi-
sion of genuine pan-European telecommunications services.
They also hinder development of advanced telecommunications
services, like multimedia and personal communications, two in-
creasingly important investment areas.
The following developments are already in place: since
1984, cooperation between T.O.s in providing cross-border com-
munications;8- a trans-European network for mobile services,
GSM;186 and a narrowband ISDN18 7 permitting limited provision
of trans-European services. As the Council stated in its Recom-
mendation on the Provision of Harmonized Integrated Services
184. Portugal Telecom: Privatisation Partielle Dbut 1995, Eu.. TELECOM, Apr. 25,
1994, at 4.
185. Current T.O. initiatives include: Infonet (comprising Belgacom, DBP
Telekom, KDD, PTT Telecom Netherlands, Singapore Telecom International, Telia In-
ternational, Swiss PT, Telstra, Telef6nica International, France T6lcom's Transpac,
and MCI); Unisource (comprising PFT Telecom Netherlands, Swiss PiT Telecom, Te-
lia of Sweden, Telef6nica, and Sita); and TeleConnet, a managed digital private leased
service based on a global network that uses fiber optic routes and was launched by the
Financial Network Association, which comprises Testra of Australia, Stentor of Canada,
Belgacom, France T6lcom, DBP Telekom, Hongkong Telecom, Italcable, KDD, Sin-
gapur Telecom, Telef6nica, Mercury, and MCI.
In addition, at the end of 1992, BT, Deutsche Bundestpost-Telekom, France
T6lcom, Stet-Iritel, and Telef6nica signed an agreement to develop an integrated
broad-band Europe-wide network using ATM that would be operative in 1994 and allow
voice, image, and data transmission. Belgacom, Telefones de Lisboa e Porto,
Televerket, Telecom Findland, Swiss PTT Telecom, Norwegian Telecom, and the
Deutsch PT Telecom recently joined the project. Users will have access to this net-
work through a multimedia terminal (i.e., a computer with a video camera and
microphone) in the early summer of 1994. The United Kingdom has already begun
marketing a videotelephone.
186. See supra Section VI(B) (discussing mobile communications).
187. See supra note 32 (defining ISDN).
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Digital Network (ISDN) Access Arrangements and a Minimum
Set of ISDN Offerings in Accordance with Open Network Provi-
sion (ONP) Principles, after January 1, 1994, all Member States
should provide ISDN access arrangements and a minimum set of
ISDN offerings.1 8 1
On November 1, 1993, the Treaty on European Union8 9
("TEU") entered into force, adding great impetus to the devel-
opment of trans-European networks. The creation of these net-
works has become a constitutional imperative, the crux of Tide
XII of the EC Treaty. 9 ° Article 129b(2) of the EC Treaty sets
forth the goal of attaining network interconnection and inter-
operability. 9 ' Moreover, Article 129c compels the Commission
to take the necessary steps to attain this objective. 92
The Commission's White Paper on Growth, Competitive-
ness and Employment' ("Growth White Paper"), issued in De-
cember 1993, also acknowledges that the Community must de-
velop trans-European networks if it is to derive the maximum
possible benefit from its newly-created internal market. Thus,
the Growth White Paper urges the Commission to deal with mar-
ket fragmentation resulting from insufficient interconnection
and interoperability, and to introduce effective mechanisms to
ensure coherent management.'94 The Growth White Paper also
identifies promising new service markets.
Essentially, Community action will occur at each of the tele-
188. Council Recommendation No. 92/383/EEC, OJ. L 200/10, annex 1 (1992).
All Member States were required to have made the following ISDN offerings available
by January 1, 1994: (a) access arrangements concerning the interfaces at CCITT de-
fined reference points, basic rates access (2B + D) at the S/T reference point, and
primary rate access (30B + D) at the S/T reference point; (b) circuit mode 64 Kbis/s
unrestricted bearer service and circuit mode 3.1 hertz audio bearer service; (c) calling
line identification presentation, calling line identification restriction, direct dialing in,
multiple subscriber number, terminal portability, and teleservices for telephony (3.1
KHz bandwidth). Id
Call-transfer services, call-forwarding services, closed user group, user-to-user sig-
naling, reverse changing, green number for voice and non-voice applications, kiosk bill-
ing, and other ISDN offerings will be provided according to published target dates and
the availability of international standards. Id.
189. TEU, supra note 2.
190. EC Treaty, supra note 2, tit. XII.
191. Id. art. 129b(2).
192. Id. art. 129c.
193. Growth, Competitiveness, Employment The Challenges and Ways Forward
into the 21st Century, White Paper, pt. C, COM (93) 700 Final (Dec. 1993).
194. Id.
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communications network's three "levels:" (a) carrier networks
for information transmission; (b) generic services; and (c)
telematic applications. This will require cooperation between
operators. Action at the carrier network level will involve consol-
idation of narrowband ISDN and installation of high-speed com-
munications networks using advanced techniques, such as Asyn-
chronous Transfer Mode. At the generic (universal) services
level, the focus will be on electronic mail, interactive digitized
video services, and accessing databases containing all genres of
information available in multimedia libraries, laboratories, and
administrations. These generic services will facilitate "telework-
ing" and help optimize employment. Telematic applications will
involve facilitating communication between public administra-
tions and developments within the framework of the Community
TNA-IDA project.
The Bangemann Group, a group of high-level information
experts, headed by the European Commissioner for Industry,
Martin Bangemann, was established to help implement the Tele-
communications White Paper's1 95 trans-European network devel-
opment projects. OnJune 1, 1994, the Group presented its con-
clusions in a report to the press. The Bangemann Report states
that considerable investment will be required to launch the in-
formation society in the next decade. As long as the market is
fully open to competition and functions in an orderly manner,
private capital will be available to develop the new services and
networks. Consequently, it is necessary to implement the "rules
of the game," in particular: (a) flexible competition rules to
stimulate cooperation; (b) rules governing licenses needed to ac-
cess the networks; (c) guidelines for ensuring interconnectabiity
and interoperability; (d) procedures for expediting dispute set-
tlement on a European scale; and (e) adequate measures to pro-
tect intellectual property and ensure privacy. The Bangemann
Group is also calling for the establishment of a body to devise a
framework to make the information society a reality.196
Since its publication, the Bangemann Report has received
virtually unanimous support from all those concerned about its
195. Telecommunications White Paper, supra note 167.
196. New Rules of the Game Offer the Only Hope of Salvation, EUR. REP., No. 1956,June
8, 1994, at 11.
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contents and gained political support at the Corfu Summit held
on June 25, 1994.
CONCLUSION
While much remains to be done before a fully liberalized
European telecommunications market is created, we are at a crit-
ical stage of that process. The foundation for future develop-
ment has been established, and the Community authorities are
eager to act against any Member State or T.O. that impedes pro-
gress.
Investors now possess a firm basis upon which to plan entry
into the European telecommunications market. Moreover, Eu-
rope's monopolies can no longer stand in the way of competi-
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tion. EC regulatory reform, including T.O. privatization and
strategic adjustment, offers U.S. operators a free ticket to profit
in Europe. The newly-structured telecommunications equip-
ment market valued at around twenty-six billion ECU, with fore-
cast growth rates of around four percent, and a similarly restruc-
tured services market worth around eighty-four billion ECU,
with an anticipated eight percent growth rate, portends excel-
lent investment opportunities.
